Case law updates

of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1. 2. Object of the Act, was to amend and consolidate the law relating to trade marks, to provide for registration and better protection of trade marks and for prevention of the use of fraudulent marks, Meghraj Biscuits Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2007) 3 SCC 780. 3. Applicability.—Applicability of the Act, over the trade mark law is a special Act meant to protect trade marks from misuse, confusion and deception. Action taken in the special Act and remedies sought which are mentioned therein which otherwise are not in derogation to the general law are not barred unless the general law expressly or impliedly excludes the applicability of the said law. Thus, special law applies over the general law, Chartered Financial Analysis Institute v. Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1373. 4. Colour as a registered Mark.—The description of the mark as including not just the colour purple as a sign, but other signs, in which the colour purple predominates over other colours and other matter, means that the mark described is not “a sign”. There is wrapped up in the verbal description of the mark an unknown number of signs. That does not satisfy the requirement of “a sign” within the meaning of Article 2 of the Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October, 2008, as interpreted in the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union, nor does it satisfy the requirement of the graphic representation of “a sign”, because the unknown number of signs means that the representation is not of “a sign”. The mark applied for thus lacks the required clarity, precision, self-containment, durability and objectivity to qualify for registration, Cadbury UK Ltd v. Société des Produits Nestlé SA, [2014] Bus LR 134 : [2013] EWCA Civ 1174 (CA). 5. “Trade mark”.—The concept of a trade mark is distinct from that of a property mark. A mark, as defined by Section 2(1)(j) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter or numerical or any combination thereof. A trade mark means a mark used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor to use that mark. The function of a trade mark is to give an indication to the purchaser or a possible purchaser as to the manufacture or quality of the goods, to an indication to his eye of the trade source from which the goods come, or the trade hands through which they pass on their way to the market. 6. “Trade mark” includes both registered and unregistered mark, State of U.P. v. Ram Nath, (1972) 1 SCC 130 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 74. 7. A descriptive trade mark is entitled to protection if it has assumed a secondary meaning which identifies it with a particular product or being from a particular source, Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Girnar Food & Beverages (P) Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 257. 8. Mark (phrase) not unique and not showing any relation with the party concerned could not be treated as brand name. Hence, phrase “new improved quick frozen french fries”, could not be treated as a brand name, Tarai Food Ltd. v. CCE, (2007) 12 SCC 721. 9. The expression “trade mark” includes the shape of goods. A manufacturer who markets a product may assert the distinctive nature of the goods sold in terms of the unique shape, Gorbatschow Wodka KG v. John Distilleries Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 557. 10. Trade mark should normally have attributes of a new creation to claim exclusivity of the user. If it is an existing word, it should not bear descriptive characteristics so far as the product is concerned, nor should it be of an extolment or laudationm, Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 190. 11. “Brand name” or “Trade name” is a mark, symbol, design or name, etc. that is used with purpose to associate a manufacturer using the same with the goods. What is necessary is that the said mark is of the nature that it establishes connection between the product and the person, CCE v. Stangen Immuno Diagnostics, (2015) 11 SCC 761. 12. Property mark.—A property mark, as defined by Section 479 of the Penal Code means a mark used for denoting that a moveable property belongs to a particular person. The distinction between a trade mark and a property mark is that whereas the former denotes the manufacture or quality of the goods to which it is attached, the latter denotes the ownership in them. In other words, a trade mark concerns the goods themselves, while a property mark concerns the proprietor. A property mark attached to the moveable property of a person remains even if part of such property goes out of his hands and ceases to be his, Sumat Prasad Jain v. Sheojanam Prasad, (1973) 1 SCC 56 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 186. 13. Domain names.—Domain names, are not merely internet website addresses but also identify specific websites. They are business identifiers, serving to identify and distinguish the business itself, or its goods or services and to specify its corresponding online location. As an address they must be unique and peculiar and where they are used in connection with a business, the value of maintaining an exclusive identity is critical. Domain names pertaining to the provisions of goods and services are words or names capable of distinguishing the subject of trade and services made available to potential users of the internet, Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145. 14. High Court and Registrar.—Section 2(1)(x) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 indicates that the High Court and the Registrar of Trade Marks, on their own, are not “Tribunal”. In view of the provisions of Sections 56, 107, 3 and 109, the phrase “before which the proceeding concerned is pending”, occurring in Section 2(1)(x) conveys the idea that if the proceeding is pending before the “Registrar”, it becomes the “Tribunal”. Similarly, if the proceeding is pending before the “High Court”, then the High Court has to be treated as the “Tribunal”. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Registrar and the High Court, though apparently concurrent in certain matters, is mutually exclusive. That is to say, if a particular proceeding is pending before the Registrar, any other proceeding, which may, in any way, relate to the pending proceeding, will have to be initiated before and taken up by the Registrar and the High Court will act as the appellate authority of the Registrar under Section 109. If the proceedings are pending before the High Court, the Registrar will keep his hands off and not touch those or any other proceedings which may, in any way, relate to those proceedings, as the High Court, which has to be the High Court having jurisdiction as set out in Section 3, besides being the appellate authority of the Registrar, has primacy over the Registrar in all matters under the Act. Any other interpretation of the definition of “Tribunal” would not be in consonance with the scheme of the Act or the contextual background set out therein and may lead to conflicting decisions on the same question by the Registrar and the High Court besides generating a multiplicity of proceedings, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1. 15. Definition of “Tribunal”.—Since “Tribunal” is defined in Section 2 which, in its opening part, uses the phrase “Unless the context otherwise requires”, the definition, obviously, cannot be read in isolation. The phrase “Unless the context otherwise requires” is meant to prevent a person from falling into the whirlpool of “definitions” and not to look to other provisions of the Act which, necessarily, has to be done as the meaning ascribed to a “definition” can be adopted only if the context does not otherwise require. 16. Validity of statement by subordinate.—Where a statement is submitted by a subordinate to the Registrar, a copy of the notification of the Central Government under Section 3(2) appointing such officer for the purpose, and the authorization of the Registrar permitting him to appear and make a statement, ought to be appended to the statement. In the absence of notification and authorization under Section 3(2), an officer of the Trade Marks Registry cannot be asked to file a statement for the purposes of

9 SCC 183. 19. Refusal of registration.—Trade mark “skyline”, devoid of any distinctive character and already being used in India, USA and UK as trade name by various companies/organisations/business concerns and also for describing different types of institutes/institutions cannot get protection by way of temporary injunction against respondents in using this word for an Institute of Engineering and Technology set up by them, Skyline Education Institute (India) (P) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, (2010) 2 SCC 142 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 345. 20. Registration of trade mark is prima facie evidence of its validity and registered trade mark cannot be held invalid in legal proceedings on ground that it was not registrable under Section 9, Consim Info (P) Ltd. v. Google India (P) Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Mad 4967. 21. Expression “Rehydrate Replenish Refuel” is prima facie suspect, as words forming said expression are an intrinsic part of the “current language” commonly used in the trade for describing the character, quality and attributes of an isotonic drink. Thus no protection can be guranteed, Stokely Van Camp, Inc. v. Heinz India (P) Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2153. 22. Absolute grounds for refusal.—“Ramayan”, a name of holy scripture of Hindus, was sought to be registered as trade mark for incensed sticks and other fragrance spreading products. Registration opposed inter alia on the ground that mark was a religious word and lacked distinctiveness. On facts, it was found that “Ramayan” was projected as prominent feature of trade mark. In addition, three main characters of the epic, namely, Rama, Sita and Lakshman, were also incorporated in the mark. Registrant intended to encash popularity of “Ramayan”. It was not a distinctive mark and was non-registrable. While arriving at this conclusion, Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the subject was also taken into consideration. It was also held, it would have been a different matter if “Ramayan” had been prefixed or suffixed with some other word or words so that “Ramayan” was not the sole feature of the mark, Lal Babu Priyadarshi v. Amritpal Singh, (2015) 16 SCC 795 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 649. Section 12 :Registration in the case of honest concurrent use, etc.—In the case of honest concurrent use or of other special circumstances which in the opinion of the Registrar, make it proper so to do, he may permit the registration by more than one proprietor of the trade marks which are identical or similar (whether any such trade mark is already registered or not) in respect of the same or similar goods or services, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as the Registrar may think fit to impose. 23. Concurrent use.—When initial adoption of a trade mark itself is malafide and tainted, continued adoption and use does not undo illegality or bestow legality. Common law protects freedom of choice and rejects claim of monopoly in large public interest but in a given case keeping in view nature and type of goods, area of business, extent of goodwill to protect interest of consumers and to avoid possibility of confusion, request for registration can be rejected. (A party which has developed and nurtured a mark to make it household name and associate the name with products of high quality, is entitled to protection from third persons who to claim benefit of its reputation, Kunj Aluminium (P) Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics Nv, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3079. 24. Registration of part of a mark.—When a part of plaintiff's exclusive word mark in the same class of goods is incorporated in the defendant's mark, it is for the defendant to establish that their use of one or more words in addition to the plaintiff's word mark would remove the defendant's mark from the prohibited umbra of what is deceptively similar, R.R. Proteins and Agro Limited v. Hari Shankar Singhania, 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 2014. 25. Degree of resemblance between the marks.—The substance of the tests in a passing off action appears to be the court's perception of the degree of resemblance between the marks. The registration of a device or label would entitle the proprietor to protection against the use of such device or label by a rival in trade if the rival's use is identical or similar to the registered trade mark and the use is in connection with identical or similar goods or services covered by such registered trade mark and it appears to court that the rival's mark is likely to cause confusion or is likely to have an association with the registered mark. If the two marks are identical and the goods and services covered by either mark are also identical, there is a presumption that arises in favour of the proprietor of the registered mark and, for interlocutory purposes, it may be enough to earn the plaintiff its injunction. If the two marks are identical and the goods and services are similar or if the two marks are similar and the goods and services are identical, the court has to weigh the likelihood of confusion or assess whether the defendant's mark is likely to have an association with the plaintiff's registered mark. The identity or similarity of the marks has to be assessed on the basis of the entirety of the mark as registered. The right that the owner of a device or label mark obtain is, loosely speaking, somewhat similar to copyright. It is as much the writing or etching in a device or label, and the design and colour combination thereof, over which the registered proprietor gains rights as the manner of depiction thereof. It is possible that a registered mark is made up of several components which are distinctive and notwithstanding separate registrations in respect of such distinctive parts not having been obtained by the owner of the registered mark, such proprietor is entitled to cite one distinctive part as being inseparable from the registered whole or such distinctive part being the most outstanding attribute of the mark and thus assert a right over the distinctive part. But in view of Section 17(2)(a) of the 1999 Act, such assertion has to be as in passing off and may not be made in aid of a case of infringement. Section 17(2) and the world beyond the statute that is recognised in Section 27 of the 1999 Act has a combined effect of permitting the registered owner to claim exclusivity of a part of the whole of the registered mark, but only on a cause of action of passing off. The expression “the registration thereof shall not confer any exclusive right” towards the end of Section 17(2) have to be understood in the context. The import of such words is that the registration of the composite mark will not ipso facto confer any exclusive right as to the parts of the composite mark. But if the owner can establish exclusivity aliunde, the owner can assert the exclusivity. The registered owner is entitled to protection of its goodwill in such prominent feature as in an action for passing off unless the registered owner seeks to rely on Section 17(2)(b) of the Act in respect of a distinctive matter not common to the trade, Three-N-Products Private Limited v. Emami Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Cal 589. 26. Registration of marks.—The right to have a mark registered is not dependent upon the actual use of the mark at the time of registration, Drums Food International (P) Ltd. v. Euro Ice Cream, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 817. 27. Grant of injunction.—The action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferring on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the indication of exclusive right to the use of trade mark in relation to those goods. The use by the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an action for passing off, but is the sine qua non in action for infringement. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction, Pankaj Jaiswal v. Virendra Prasad Jaiswal, 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 528. 28. Special Acts.—Trade Marks Act is a special Act, hence the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply only so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law to the suits, appeals or applications under the special law, Allied

Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723. 18. Registration of trade mark.—Registration of phonetically similar mark “NANDHINI” to the earlier registered/in use mark “NANDINI” is permissible when such latter mark is used for different goods/nature of business and visual appearance of two marks is so different that average person of ordinary intelligence would not be deceived or confused between goods concerned. Further, registration of trade mark qua certain goods falling under one class does not vest monopoly over the entire class of goods with the proprietor of registered mark, Nandhini

(P) Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 785. 17. Scope of the section.—The Section 9 does not bar the registrar from registration of marks which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, Khoday Distilleries

Board, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 1439. 29. Extension of limitation.—Registrar of trade marks cannot receive a notice of opposition to the registration of a trade mark given beyond the period prescribed under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Trade Marks Act prescribes procedure for registration of Trade Mark Act confers certain rights on person desirous of opposing registration of trade mark. Such right has to be exercised vigilantly. Registrar cannot extend time for sending notice of opposition, Allied Blenders and Distillers (P)

Property Appellate Board, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 1439. 31. Extension of time.—It is a ministerial act which requires only Registrar's satisfaction. Hence, Registrar need not pass a separate order in every case if he wishes to extend the time. Jagatjit Industries Ltd. v. Intellectual Property Appellate Board, (2016) 4 SCC 381 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 606. 32. Appeal to Supreme Court.—Refusal of Registration of trade mark “Royal Orchid” to the petitioner in Class 42, when the mark/logo “Orchid” was being used by Respondent 1 from an anterior date, affirmed, Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. v. Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 728. 33. Origin of trade marks.—In law of trade mark there can be only one mark, one source and one proprietor. It cannot have two origins, Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448. Section 27 :No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark.—(1) No person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of an unregistered trade mark. (2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for passing off goods or services as the goods of another person or as services provided by another person, or the remedies in respect thereof. 34. Remedy for infringement.—The Trade Marks Act, 1999 incorporates specific provisions for the consequence of registration. The remedy of infringement is available upon registration. Under sub-section (1) of Section 27 no person is entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent, or to recover damages for the infringement of an unregistered trade mark. Sub-section (2), however, saves the right of action for passing off of goods or services and the remedies in respect thereof. Under sub-section (1) of Section 28, the registration of a trade mark, if valid, furnishes to the registered proprietor the exclusive right to the use of the mark “in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered” and to obtain relief in respect of infringement in the manner provided by the Act, Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. v. Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 460. 35. Section 27(2) is a statutory recognition of the principle that the remedy of passing off lies and is founded in common law. It is not restricted only in relation to goods of a particular nature or quality but across the spectrum of trade and business, Gorbatschow Wodka Kg v. John Distilleries Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 557. 36. Cause of action for first suit is passing off, cause of action for second suit is infringement. Action for passing off is common law remedy, action for infringement is statutory remedy. Registration of trade mark gives to registered proprietor, exclusive right to use of trade mark and to obtain relief in respect of infringement, Thalappakatti Naidu Ananda Vilas

1439. 30. Notice of opposition.—Trade Marks Act prescribes procedure for registration of trade mark. The Act confers certain rights on person desirous of opposing registration of trade mark. Such right has to be exercised vigilantly. Registrar cannot extend time for sending notice of opposition as period prescribed by section cannot be extended, Allied Blenders And

OnLine Mad 780. 37. Grant of injunction.—Passing-off actions in respects of unregistered trade marks permissible in light of Section 27, Trade Marks Act, 1999. Grant of interim injunction is permissible in case plaintiff can show prima facie case that it was prior user of its mark, and balance of convenience was in its favour, Dhariwal Industries Ltd. v. M.S.S. Food Products, (2005) 3 SCC 63. 38. Passing off action, Scope and meaning.—Passing off action is essentially an action in deceit where common law rule is that no person is entitled to carry on his or her business on pretext that said business is of that of another. Three ingredients of passing off are : (i) goodwill owned by trader, (ii) misrepresentation, and (iii) damage to goodwill. Passing off in common law is considered to be a right for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on account of said misrepresentation, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 39. Scope of Passing-off.—Existence of deceit or mens rea, is a contributing factor in concluding that passing off has taken place. In as much as passing off involves an attempt to capitalize on the goodwill of another, existence of such goodwill is an indispensable sine qua non for passing off, VBM Medizintechnik GMBH v. Geetan Luthra, (2023) 5 HCC (Del) 492. Section 28 :Rights conferred by registration.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by this Act. (2) The exclusive right to the use of a trade mark given under sub-section (1) shall be subject to any conditions and limitations to which the registration is subject. (3) Where two or more persons are registered proprietors of trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble each other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those trade marks shall not (except so far as their respective rights are subject to any conditions or limitations entered on the register) be deemed to have been acquired by any one of those persons as against any other of those persons merely by registration of the trade marks but each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as against other persons (not being registered users using by way of permitted use) as he would have if he were the sole registered proprietor. 40. Registration with retrospective effect.—The Registrar, Trade Marks, can issue registration certificate under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act with retrospective effect. But the effect of making the registration certificate applicable from retrospective date is based on the principle of deemed equivalence to public user of such mark. This deeming fiction cannot be extended to the excise law. It is confined to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, Meghraj Biscuits Industries Ltd. v. CCE, (2007) 3 SCC 780. 41. Effect of registration.—Rights of action under Section 27(2) are not affected by Sections 28(3) and 30(1)(d). Therefore, registration of a trade mark would be irrelevant in an action for passing off. Registration of a trade mark in fact does not confer any new right on the proprietor thereof than what already existed at common law without registration of the mark, Bharat N. Parikh and Rajen A. Kamdar v. Ashok Tripathy, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 790. 42. Rights conferred through registration.—Right to sue for infringement of trade mark accrues only after a trade mark has been registered, proposed registration or application for registration does not confer such a right, K. Narayanan v. S. Murali, (2008) 10 SCC 479. 43. Action for passing off is common law remedy, action for infringement is a statutory remedy. Registration of trade mark gives to registered proprietor, exclusive right to use of trade mark and to obtain relief in respect of infringement, Thalappakatti Naidu Ananda Vilas Biriyani

780. 44. So long as the mark continues to be on the register the proprietor is entitled to the benefit of every statutory protection that is available, Kores (India) Ltd. v. Whale Stationery Products Ltd., 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1076. 45. Purpose of expression “if valid”.—The expression “if valid” has been inserted for the purpose that post registration an aggrieved person is entitled to apply for cancellation under Section 57 of the Act even if no suit is filed alleging infringement of the registered trade mark. In case a suit is instituted, the court, once there is already a pending action seeking cancellation of the trade mark, will stay the suit till the final disposal of the cancellation/rectification proceedings. The court however is still entitled to, in spite of registration, pass any interlocutory order as it deems fit, including but not limited to, granting the injunction or dismissing the prayer for injunction. If no cancellation proceedings are pending as on the date of filing of a suit for infringement if the court is satisfied with regard to the plea of invalidity of registration (this language of Section 124(1)(a)(i) co-relates to the expression “if valid” as occurring in Section 28) then the court may raise an issue in the suit and adjourn the case for three months after framing the issues in order to enable the defendant to apply to the Appellate Board for rectification of the register. Even in the circumstances where the court stays the suit for three months and permits a party to apply for cancellation/rectification, the court can pass any interlocutory order as it thinks fit under sub-section (5) of Section 124. In view of the co-relation between Section 28 and different sub-sections of Section 124, it becomes clear that the entitlement to claim invalidity of registration on the ground of the expression “if valid” as found under Section 28 only arises if the defendant in his written statement in a suit alleging infringement of a registered trade mark takes up the plea with respect to registration of trade mark being “invalid” or has already applied for cancellation of the registered trade mark before the suit alleging infringement is filed, Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3806. 46. Rights of registered user.—Registration merely recognises rights which are already pre-existing in common law and does not create any new rights. Registration of trade mark, therefore, is no defence to passing off action as Act of 1999 does not bar passing off action. Registered proprietor of trade mark has : (i) exclusive right to use trade mark, and (ii) to obtain relief in case of infringement of trade mark. However, such a right is not absolute but subject to rights of prior user for passing off that are available to him under common law, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 47. Conflict between two registered owners.—Between two registered owners of same or similar trade mark, exclusive right to use trade mark is not available to one registrant against the other registered owner (the other registered owner has the same rights against third persons). Hence, plaintiff cannot say that its registered trade mark is infringed only on the ground of registration of its trade mark, when defendant is also enjoying registration of the trade mark and such registration also gives right to defendant to use the same, as provided in Section 28(1), unless plaintiff can establish a superior right at common, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 48. Right of prior user vis-à-vis prior registrant.—It is to find which proprietor has generated goodwill by way of use of the mark/name in the business. Examination of rights in common law based on goodwill, misrepresentation and damage are independent to that of registered rights. Use of the mark/carrying on business under the name confers rights in favour of the person and generates goodwill in the market. Hence, latter user of the mark/name or in the business cannot misrepresent his business as that of business of prior right holder, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 49. Non-exclusive trade marks.—Exclusive use of, trade mark, registered with the disclaimer that registration shall not give exclusive right of use, not permitted, Parakh Vanijya (P) Ltd. v. Baroma Agro Product, (2018) 16 SCC 632. Section 29 : Infringement of registered trade marks. 50. Aim and object of this provision.—Object of this provision is to protect value and goodwill of trade marks. The expression “without due cause” requires defendant to show that not merely use of infringing mark is in connection with defendant's services but “with due cause”. Adding one “I” to word “Luxura” and displaying same on bus in same position cannot be said to be “with due cause”. 51. Section 29(4)(C) enacts that “use of the mark without due cause” takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character or reputation of the registered trade mark. 52. Section 11(2) enacts that “the use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark”. In cases where the public are confused into thinking that there is a commercial connection between the suppliers of the goods or services supplied under the earlier trade mark and the mark the subject of the application, then it is to be anticipated that the prohibition will apply. Such confusion as to origin (origin association) is likely to take unfair advantage of and be damaging to the distinctive nature of reputation of the earlier trade mark, Blue Hill Logistics (P) Ltd. v. Ashok Leyland Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 671. 53. Relative scope and applicability of Sections 29(2) and 29(4).—The legislative intent is very clear, (i) insofar as sub-section (2) of Section 29 is concerned, it is sufficient that any of the conditions as provided in clauses (a), (b) or (c) is satisfied; (ii) by employing the word “and” after clauses (a) and (b) in sub-section (4) of Section 29, it is clear that unless all the three conditions are satisfied, it will not be open to the proprietor of the registered trade mark to sue for infringement, Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1. 54. Deceptively similar.—In order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered. They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other. It would be enough if the impugned mark bears such an overall similarity, to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him, Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. and Co., (1972) 1 SCC 618. 55. Trade mark — Infringement.—While Section 29(2) deals with those situations where the trade mark is identical or similar and the goods covered by such a trade mark are identical or similar, Section 29(4) deals with situations where though the trade mark is identical, the goods or services are not similar. When the mark is both identical to registered trade mark and used in relation to identical goods/services, Section 29(2)(c) and presumption under Section 29 (3) will be applicable, as opposed to Section 29(4), Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1. 56. Infringement of trade mark.—Sub-section (9) of Section 29 provides that where the distinctive elements of a registered trade mark consist of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken use of those words as well as by their visual representation. Thus, the use of the word “SAI RENAISSANCE” which is phonetically and visually similar to “RENAISSANCE", would also be an act of infringement, Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1. 57. Applicability.—Twin conditions for applicability of Section 30(1), namely : (i) the use of the impugned trade mark being in accordance with the honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and (ii) that such a use is not such as to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark, must be satisfied, Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai, (2022) 5 SCC 1. 58. Effect of registration.—The registration under one class, in any event, does not extend to goods or services under another class. 59. A suit by a registered proprietor of a trademark against another registered proprietor of the same trademark cannot be declined to be entertained at the threshold because of Section 30(2)(e). Such a suit can lie but may have to be stayed depending upon the defence raised by the defendants that cancellation petition for removal of registered trademark pending before Registrar of Trade Marks, Singer Co. Ltd. v. Chetan Machine Tools, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 462. 60. Passing off.—Passing-off action for a mark having goodwill and reputation in jurisdictions other than India, as in the present case for the mark “Prius”, Cannot be successfully maintained in the absence of such mark having sufficient goodwill or reputation in India, Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1. Section 34 : Saving for vested rights.—Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to goods or services in relation to which that person or a predecessor in title of his has continuously used that trade mark from a date prior— (a) to the use of the first-mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods or services be the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; or (b) to the date of registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services in the name of the proprietor of a predecessor in title of his; whichever is the earlier, and the Registrar shall not refuse (on such use being proved) to register the second mentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark. 61. Scope.—Where a mark is registered without opposition from a party filing an action for passing off, the order of the Registrar does not and cannot affect the party nor bind the court from considering the question of passing off. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the provisions of the Act. It would render Section 34 redundant. Section 34 can be availed of in an application for registration as well as a defence to an infringement action, Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1061. 62. Section 34 provides for saving of vested rights in a registered trademark, even though the Defendant has not taken any step to challenge registration by Plaintiff, Wheels India v. S. Nirmal Singh, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3251. 63. Overriding provision.—Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act carves out an exception and creates an overriding provision which within the sphere of its operation prevents a proprietor or registered user of a registered trade mark from interfering with the use of an identical trade mark or a mark which nearly resembles the registered mark. Section 34 in consequence provides for a defeasance of the statutory entitlement which flows from the registration of a trade mark. Before such a consequence ensues the conditions which Parliament has enacted must be fulfilled. The most fundamental requirement is fourfold. Firstly, the use by a person of a mark which is identical to or nearly resembles a registered trade mark must be in relation to those goods and services for which the first mentioned mark has been registered. Secondly, the use that is postulated by Section 34 is a continuous use of the trade mark. Thirdly, in order to avail of the protection the trade mark must be used by the proprietor or by his predecessor-in-interest. Fourthly, the mark in respect of which protection is sought must have been used from a date prior to the use of the registered trade mark or the date of registration of the registered trade mark whichever is earlier. Section 34 thus provides for specific requirements which relate to, (i) the nature of the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used; (ii) the nature and character of use; (iii) the person who must use; and (iv) the date from which the mark should have been used, Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. v. Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 460. 64. Expression “date of registration”.—The expression “date of registration” in Section 34(b) must mean the date of the application for registration for, that is, the date to which the registration, when granted, will relate, Drums Food International (P) Ltd. v. Euro Ice Cream., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 817. 65. Defence of Pendency of Rectification.—Pendency of Rectification Proceedings under Section 124 cannot be a valid defence for the infringement action initiated by the proprietor of the trade mark and for obtaining an order of interim injunction, Nakoda Dairy (P) Ltd. v. Kewal Chand Vinod Kumar, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 707. 66. Advertisement.—Mere issuance of advertisement does not constitute prior user. The advertisement must be concurrent with placing of goods in market, Pioneer Nuts and Bolts (P) Ltd. v. Goodwill Enterprises, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2851. 67. Passing off action.—Passing off right, held, is a broader remedy for it being based on the common law principle which offers protection against exploitation of business goodwill which is attached to both registered and unregistered trade marks, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 68. Prior registration and prior user.—Prior user's rights will override those of a subsequent user even though subsequent user had been accorded registration of its trade mark. Proprietor of a trade mark does not have the right to prevent use by another party of an identical or similar mark where that user commenced prior to the user or prior to date of registration of proprietor. Such user gets rights when its user is prior to the user of registered proprietor or prior to the date of registration of the proprietor, whichever is earlier, Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 190. 69. Rights of prior user vis-à-vis prior registrant of trade mark.— Registered proprietor of trade mark has right to use said trade mark to the exclusion of others but the same is subject to right of prior user of trade mark under common law. Thus, prior user has superior right over registered owner. Further held, in case of conflict between two registered proprietors, evaluation of better rights in common law is essential to enable court to determine whose rights are better and superior in common law which have been recognised in the form of registration. Owner of registered trade mark has right to use said trade mark to the exclusion of others but such right is subject to common law remedies available under passing off action. Registration merely recognises rights which are already pre-existing in common law and does not create any new rights. Registration of trade mark, therefore, is no defence to passing off action as Act of 1999 does not bar passing off action. However, between two registered owners of same or similar trade mark, exclusive right to use trade mark is not available to one registrant against the other registered owner (the other registered owner has the same rights against third persons). Hence, plaintiff cannot say that its registered trade mark is infringed only on the ground of registration of its trade mark, when defendant is also enjoying registration of the trade mark and such registration also gives right to defendant to use the same, as provided in

Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 190. Section 35 : Saving for use of name, address or description of goods or services.—Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a registered trade mark to interfere with any bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of his place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of business, of any of his predecessors in business, or the use by any person of any bona fide description of the character or quality of his goods or services. 71. Distinctiveness.—The word “Goenka” being a common surname per se is not distinctive and to acquire distinctiveness in such a common surname is not possible. Defence under Section 35 of Act will only apply to a full name and that also by a natural person and not by a legal entity which can choose a separate name. Also once distinctiveness is achieved or secondary meaning acquired with respect to a surname then another person cannot use that surname for an artificial person or entity, Goenka

683 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 201. 70. Hoarding of a trade mark.—Hoarding of or appropriation, without utilisation of a trade mark is not permitted. Mere registration of a trade mark does not vest permanent right on owner of said trade mark. Such a right is lost if it is not exercised within a reasonable time, Neon Laboratories

OnLine Del 1691. 72. Low absorb technology.—Expression “low absorb technology” in relation to edible oil product amounts to passing off the goods which uses the unregistered trade mark “low absorb”, Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3806. Section 38 : Assignability and transmissibility of registered trade marks.— Notwithstanding anything in any other law to the contrary, a registered trade mark shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be assignable and transmissible, whether with or without the goodwill of the business concerned and in respect either of all the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered or of some only of those goods or services. 73. Transmissibility of trade mark.—Traditionally, a trade mark has always been considered a vital and inseparable part of the goodwill of the business. In fact, the sale of a trade mark without the sale of the goodwill to the same buyer is considered null and void. However, the trade mark can be assigned with or without the goodwill of business though subject to certain conditions, Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726. 74. Entitlement to exemption under Notification No. 1/93 dated 28-2- 1993.—One of the conditions in the exemption notification provided that exemption would not apply to the specified goods, bearing a brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another person. Assessee was using the brand name of a foreign company, which had assigned the trade mark in its favour under an agreement with right to use the trade mark in India exclusively. It was held, because of the assignment, the assessee was using the trade mark in its own right as its own trade mark and therefore, it could not be said that it was using the trade mark of “another person”. Assessee held entitled to avail the benefit of exemption notification, CCE v. Otto Bilz (India) (P) Ltd., (2016) 13 SCC 559. 75. Assignment of trade mark.—Title of mark exists in assignee even before registration. A dispute about assignment can be raised by the assignor or by a person claiming prior assignment. Dispute cannot be raised by stranger or persons claiming adversely to assignor, Sun

1135. 76. Rationale for.—Intention is a state of mind. Court can deduce the existence of a particular state of mind from the facts of a case. It can look at events prior to the relevant date viz. the date of the application for registration as well as at the events subsequent thereto for ascertaining the intention. However, whether subsequent events are relevant or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the question at issue therein. Where a trade mark is proposed to be used, the manufacture and marketing of goods in relation to which such trade mark is proposed to be used must of necessity take time; and not to look at the subsequent events would result in great injustice, American Home Products Corpn. v. Mac Laboratories (P) Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 465. 77. “Person aggrieved”.—The expression “person aggrieved” has been liberally construed in trade mark law except for trade mark merely consisting of a name, Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (Toshiba Corpn.) v. Toshiba Appliances Co., 2005 SCC OnLine Cal 596. 78. Validity of the registration of the trade mark.—In a case where the issue of invalidity is raised or arises independent of a suit, the prescribed statutory authority will be the sole authority to deal with the matter. However, in a situation where a suit, inter alia, raising the issue of validity of the trade mark is pending (whether instituted before or after the filing of a rectification application) the exercise of jurisdiction by the prescribed statutory authority is contingent on a finding of the civil court as regards the prima facie tenability of the plea of invalidity, Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 112. 79. Jurisdiction of civil court.—All issues relating to and connected with the validity of registration have to be dealt with by the Tribunal and not by the civil court. Once an issue connected with the validity of registration is framed by the civil court, the matter will have to go to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal will thereafter bind the civil court, Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 112. 80. Grant of licence to registered user.—Use of a registered trade mark can be permitted to a registered user in accordance with provisions of the Act and for that purpose the registered proprietor has to enter into an agreement with the proposed registered user. The use of the trade mark can also be permitted dehors the provisions of the Act by grant of licence by the registered proprietor to the proposed user. Such a licence is governed by common law. Such licensing of trade mark is permissible provided (i) the licensing does not result in causing confusion or deception among the public; (ii) it does not destroy the distinctiveness of the trade mark, that is to say, the trade mark, before the public eye, continues to distinguish the goods connected with the proprietor of the mark from those connected with others; and (iii) a connection in the course of trade consistent with the definition of trade mark continues to exist between the goods and the proprietor of the mark, Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545. 81. Terms of licence.—A common law licence cannot result in dilution of the trade mark. A licence has to be interpreted to prevent the mischief which is deceptive since trafficking in trade marks is not permitted, Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726. 82. Use by permissive user.—Once a licence or permissive user arrangement is terminated, unless the erstwhile licence can set up another permission, or authorization (for use) by the trade mark owner, estoppel operates against the permissive user, Marie Stopes Int. v. Parivar Seva Sanstha, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 775. 83. Applicability.—Section 55 confers the discretion contained therein upon the Tribunal. It does not apply to a court and would only apply to proceedings before the Tribunal i.e. the Registrar or the Appellate

Bom 1061. 84. Jurisdiction of Registrar.—Suo motu power of rectification of register under Section 57(4) can only be exercised by Registrar of Trade Marks himself being one of the authorities who are “tribunal” as per Section 2(1)(ze) r/w Section 3, and as there is only one such Registrar for the entire country having registered office in Bombay assisted by Assistant Registrars in other parts of the country, including Delhi, Jagatjit

381 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 606. 85. Suo motu power of Registrar to rectify register, held, not affected or curtailed by Section 125. Reasons for, explained. Position contrasted with position that had obtained under Sections 107/47 of the Trade and

Property Appellate Board, (2016) 4 SCC 381 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 606. 86. Cancellation of registration.—When registration cancelled due to a clerical error on the part of the Trade Marks Registry in the details of the published application and not as a result of any decision of the rights of the plaintiff in the impugned mark, injunction cannot be vacated, Chartered Financial Analysis Institute v. Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1373. 87. Rectification of register.—The power of registrar to rectify the register is wide and discretionary jurisdiction, and, in a given case, he may refuse to exercise it. Although the discretionary jurisdiction of a statutory authority has to be considered on objective criteria, delay in filing of rectification application leading to acquiescence or waiver or abandonment is not totally irrelevant, Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723. 88. Use of similar trade mark.—The use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his product does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the public to mistake the origin of its product, William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1924 SCC OnLine US SC 156. 89. Offence by Company.—The company cannot be prosecuted for offences involving mens rea and/or involving compulsory punishment of imprisonment, A.K. Khosla v. T.S. Venkatesan & State of W.B., 1991 SCC OnLine Cal 225. [Champa Agency v. R. Chowdhury, 1974 CHN 400; Sunil Chandra v. Krishna Chandra, 1948 SCC OnLine Cal 149; Machine India

SCC OnLine Cal 197. 92. The accused had a domicile of origin in the district of Multan and had to be assigned Pakistani domicile on partition of India. He committed an offence in Pakistan. He cannot be tried for that offence by a Criminal Court of India after his migration to India on his acquisition of the status of a citizen of India, Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Ram Narain, (1954) 2 SCC 378. 93. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although there are earlier authorities to the effect that corporations cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes as a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason of the fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may be subject to indictment or other criminal process, although the criminal act is committed through its agents. 94. As in the case of torts, the general rule prevails that the corporation may be criminally liable for the acts of an officer or agent, assumed to be done by him when exercising authorised powers, and without proof that his act was expressly authorised or approved by the corporation. In the statutes defining crimes, the prohibition is frequently directed against any “person” who commits the prohibited act, and in many statutes the term “person” is defined. Even if the person is not specifically defined, it necessarily includes a corporation. It is usually construed to include a corporation so as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute and subject it to punishment. In most of the statutes, the word “person” is defined to include a corporation. 95. Inasmuch as all criminal and quasi-criminal offences are creatures of statute, the amenability of the corporation to prosecution necessarily depends upon the terminology employed in the statute. In the case of strict liability, the terminology employed by the legislature is such as to reveal an intent that guilt shall not be predicated upon the automatic breach of the statute but on the establishment of the actus reus, subject to the defence of due diligence. The law is primarily based on the terms of the statutes. In the case of absolute liability where the legislature by the clearest intendment establishes an offence where liability arises instantly upon the breach of the statutory prohibition, no particular state of mind is prerequisite to guilt. Corporations and individual persons stand on the same footing in the face of such a statutory offence. It is a case of automatic primary responsibility. Therefore, as regards corporate criminal liability, there is no doubt that a corporation or company could be prosecuted for any offence punishable under law, whether it is coming under the strict liability or under absolute liability, Standard Chartered

followed. MCD v. J.B. Bottling Co., 1975 SCC OnLine Del 47 dissented from.] 90. Municipal Corporation can be prosecuted for offences which are only punishable with fine. Imprisonment of Municipal Corporation is out of question, Girdharilal v. Lalchand, 1969 SCC OnLine Raj 36. 91. A company or body corporate is not a “person” within the meaning of

SCC OnLine Cal 70; Kusum v. S.K. Sinha, 1980 SCC OnLine Cal 160; East India Jute and

961. 96. Cognizance of Offence.—As to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Section 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance, Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 39. 97. Limitation of prosecution.—The legislature in enacting Section 92 of Act 43 of 1958 has clearly made departure from Section 15 of Act 4 of 1889 in important respects. Whereas under Section 15 prosecution had to be commenced within three years next after the commission of the offence or within one year after the first discovery thereof by the prosecutor, under Section 92 the prosecution must be commenced before the expiration of three years next after the commission of the offence charged or from the date of discovery by the prosecutor of the offence charged. The argument which could be raised under Section 15 and was approved in Ruppell case, (1889) ILR 22 Mad 488, that the legislature intended to provide that the period shall commence from the first discovery thereof by the prosecutor is plainly not open to the offender infringing the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act under Section 92. The period has to be commuted for the purpose of the first part of the section from the date of commission of the offence charged, and under the second part from the date of discovery of the offence charged, and not from the first discovery of infringement of trade mark by the prosecutor, Ram Kishore v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 60. Section 122 : Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 98. “Good faith”.—Honest intent free from taint of fraud or fraudulent design is a constant element of the connotation of ‘good faith’. Ev . Even so, the quality and quantity of the honesty requisite for constituting ‘go good faith’ i is conditioned by the context and object of the statute in which this term is employed, Brijendra Singh v. State of U.P., (1981) 1 SCC 597. 99. In order to establish good faith and bona fide it has to be seen first the circumstances under which the letter was written or words were uttered; secondly, whether there was any malice; thirdly, whether the appellant made any enquiry before he made the allegations; fourthly, whether there are reasons to accept the version that he acted with care and caution, and finally, whether there is preponderance of probability that the appellant acted in good faith, Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590. 100. Rectification of register.—Provisions of Section 125(1) are attracted only when an application for rectification of register is filed by a defendant who is pleading that registration of said trade mark itself is invalid in a suit filed for infringement of trade mark, or, by a plaintiff who is questioning validity of registration of defendant's trade mark and by none else. Rectification application before the filing of such suit may be filed either before Registrar or before Appellate Board. However, if rectification proceedings are instituted after filing of such suit, rectification proceedings can only be taken before Appellate Board and not before Registrar. Lastly, Section 125(1) applies only to applications for rectification of the register, and not at all to the exercise of suo motu powers of the Registrar under Section 57(4), Jagatjit Industries

2 SCC (Civ) 606. Section 134 :Suit for infringement, etc. to be instituted before District Court.—(1) No suit— (a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or (b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or (c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered or unregistered, shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. (2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), “person” includes the registered proprietor and the registered user. 101. Nature of provision.—Provisions of Section 134(2) are mandatory and the plaintiff can bring an action for infringement in a jurisdiction stipulated by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 or any other law or at its option in a jurisdiction stipulated in Section 134, Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1061. 102. Territorial jurisdiction.—A corporation, in view of Explanation appended to Section 20, CPC would be deemed to be carrying on business inter alia at a place where it has a subordinate office. Ordinarily, the residence of a company would be where the registered office is. Only because its goods are being sold at a place would evidently not mean that it carries on a business at that place, Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41. 103. Section 134 only stipulates the territorial jurisdiction within which an action for infringement can be filed and it is not relevant to the question whether the infringement has taken place or not, Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1061. 104. Legislators want to encourage the victims of violation of Trade Marks to institute suit in their own place, instead of going to the place of the defendant and institute a suit there. Section 134 of the Act should be taken as one recognising the right of the plaintiff, who is having the genuine grievance that he has been wronged in any manner by another person, relating to his right concerning the registered Trade mark, which includes threat, as contemplated under Section 142 of the Act, to file the suit in his own place of residence or place of business, M.K. Sowbhagyam v. Wipro Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 1385. 105. Pari materia provisions.—Section 62, Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134, Trade Marks Act, 1999 are in pari materia. Sections 62(2) and 134(2) contain the word “include” which means that place where plaintiff is residing, carrying on business, etc. is an additional place and not an exclusive place to institute trade mark or copyright suit/proceedings. Thus, if cause of action, wholly or in part arises at principal or ordinary place where plaintiff resides/carries on business/personally works for gain, and in case of a corporation, where its principal office/head office/registered office is situate, then copyright/trade mark suit/proceedings can be filed only at such place and not at other places, such as branch/subordinate office or some other place of residence, etc. Section 62(2) and Section 134(2) were never intended to permit the situation wherein even though the cause of action arises wholly or in part at principal place of business or residence of plaintiff, yet plaintiff chooses to file suit/proceedings at a distant place where its subordinate office or other place of business is situated though at such place no cause of action has arisen. This approach is consistent with real purpose for which Sections 62(2) and 134(2) were enacted. Sections 62(2) and 134(2) have to be purposively construed. Purpose of enacting Sections 62(2) and 134(2), held, is to tone down the rigours of Section 20 CPC by providing additional forum which is convenient to plaintiff in a trade mark/copyright dispute. Sections 62(2) and 134(2) though they contain non obstante clause, “notwithstanding anything contained in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”, yet they do not completely override Section 20 CPC. Counter-mischief to the defendant has to be mitigated while ensuring the convenience of the additional forum made available to plaintiff by Section 62(2) and Section 134(2), Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161.

Appellant can have no exclusive ownership rights on the Trade Mark "LOW ABSORB". Also, the Respondent is selling its product with a prominent Trade Mark "Sundrop" and which appears on the packaging of the Respondent in a very prominent size, much larger than the size of the expression "LOW ABSORB TECHNOLOGY". The colour scheme of the respective packaging is different merely because, the consumers are same and the trade channel is also same, it cannot be said that there is a possibility of confusion, because there are more than enough differentiating features on the packaging so as to avoid any issue of the Respondent passing of its goods as that of the Appellant .Thus, even though the two respective products of the parties are identical viz edible oil, it cannot be said that the respondent is passing of its goods as that of the plaintiff .Appeal is dismissed. ### (iii) ### Himalaya Drug Company vs S.B.L Limited 2010 (43) PTC 739 (Del) In this case the plaintiff Himalaya drug Company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of Ayurvedic medical preparations since 1930. One of the preparations manufactured and marketed by the plaintiff is under the trademark LIV-52 where the LIV stands for LIVER TONIC. It is a liver tonic prescribed for liver disorder and to protect the liver against various dysfunction, damage and hepatotoxins. The defendant SBL also launched its product in the same category under the name ‘LIV-T’. Plaintiff claimed that LIV-T is deceptively similar with the mark LIV-52 and is likely to mislead or confuse those who are likely to purchase such preparations in the market. Thus, the court held that- ‘Nobody can claim exclusive right to use any generic word, abbreviation, acronym which has become public juris. In the trade of drugs, it is common practice to name a drug by the name of the organ or ailment, which it treats or the main ingredient of the drug. Such an organ ailment or ingredient being public jurisdiction or generic cannot be owned by anyone for use as a trademark.’ Hence, the plaintiff claim is not valid. (iv) ### Indo-Pharma Pharmaceutical vs Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticalson AIR 1998 Mad 347. The Madras High Court in while dealing with two marks 'Enerjex' and 'Enerjase' held that the abbreviation of a generic word will also be generic. The appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling pharmaceutical medical preparations.The respondent is also involved in the same business. The appellant filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from infringing plaintiff's registered trademark in respect of infants and invalid foods by use of the offending trade mark 'ENERJASE' or any other trade mark which is deceptively or phonetically similar to the plaintiff's trade mark 'ENERJEX'.In this case reliance was placed on the extract from McCarthy in Trademarks and Unfair Competition. Since the components 'Jase' and 'Jex' were completely dissimilar, injunction was refused by the Court to the plaintiff. On appeal the Madras High Court held as follows: The two rival marks 'ENERJEX' and 'ENERJASE' contain the common feature 'ENERJ' which is not only descriptive but also public juris. Therefore, a customer will tend to ignore the common feature and will pay more attention to uncommon features i.e. `JEX' and `JASE'. These two cannot be said to have such phonetic similarity so as to make it objectionable. So, the word `ENERG/J' used as a prefix in both the trade names is the abbreviation of the generic term of the English word `energy'. As such, it is descriptive in nature and common in usage. Nobody can claim an exclusive right to the use of the word `ENERG/J' as the constituent of any trademark. ### A PERSON CLAIMING EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OVER AN EXPRESSION CANNOT ### CHALLENGE THE SAME AS GENERIC Here we discuss the Principle of approbate and reprobate, i.e. to accept and reject, this principle says that that which is approved cannot be disapproved,It is equally well-settled that the party cannot be allowed to approbate or reprobate at the same time so as to take one position, when the matter is going to his advantage and another when it is operating to his detriment and more so, when there is a same matter either at the same level or the appellate stage. Therefore, a person who has on one hand claimed exclusive rights over a mark or expression, cannot challenge the same as generic. (i) ### Automatic Electric Limited vs R.K. Dhawan&Anr. 1994 SCC OnLine Del 632. In this case it was held that a person claiming exclusive right over an expression cannot challenge the same expression as generic.Plaintiff adopted in the year 1945, the trade mark ‘DIMMERSTAT’ in relation to variable voltage auto transformers. Plaintiff was also the registered proprietor of the trade mark ‘DIMMERSTAT’ in Class 9.The case of the Plaintiff was that the Defendants had adopted the trade mark ‘DIMMER DOT’ in relation to variable voltage auto transformers and the said mark is likely to cause confusion or deception amongst the members of the public as it was deceptively similar with the trade mark ‘DIMMERSTAT’ of the Plaintiff. Defendant contented that ‘DIMMER’ being a generic word is incapable of serving a trade mark function. According to him, the word "DIMMER" signifies and connotes an auto variable transformer, therefore, no trader could monopolies the use of this word in relation to auto variable transformer and registration of such word having a direct reference to the character or quality of the goods is prohibited under section 9(1)(d) of the Trade and Merchandise Act. He refuted the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that auto variable transformers are not called “DIMMERS”. The court held that the ‘DIMMER DOT’ of the Defendants is not a registered trade mark.The word ‘DIMMER’ as is understood in the common parlance is connected with an arrangement for regulating the supply of the electricity, but the product here is not a ‘DIMMER’, but, a variable transformer.The court further said that the Defendants got their trade mark ‘DIMMER DOT’ registered in Australia. The fact that the Defendant itself has sought to claim trade proprietary right and monopoly in ‘DIMMER DOT’, it does not lie in their mouth to say that the word ‘DIMMER’ is a generic expression.Therefore, injunction was confirmed. ### (ii) ### Blue Hill Logistics Private Ltd. vs. Ashok Leyland Ltd. and Ors 2011 (48) PTC 564 (Mad). Plaintiff filed suit for infringement and passing off and for various consequential relief's against Defendants. An order granting temporary injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner infringing the Plaintiff's registered trade mark "LUXURA" by use of similar mark "LUXURIA".The court held that 1st Defendant is using almost identical trade mark "LUXURIA" prominently displayed on the buses in the same position as that of the Plaintiff.1st Defendant himself had applied for registration of trade mark "LUXURIA" under Classes 39 and 35 despite the fact that there is a prohibition under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act. The person claiming exclusive right over the expression cannot challenge the same expression as generic. Once the First Defendant is permitted to use the mark "LUXURIA" on the buses purchased by them from the competitors of the Plaintiff, the competitors of the Plaintiff [VOLVO] could not also be prevented from using the said mark later on. There is no bona fide/honest conception of the trade mark "LUXURIA" by the 1st Defendant. Plaintiff has established a case to attract the ingredients of Section 29(4) and the infringing by use of such mark would amount to 1st Defendant taking unfair advantage of reputation of the Plaintiff's mark and would be detrimental to the registered trade mark of the Plaintiff. Having regard to the Plaintiff's exclusive right to use of the mark and weighing the various factors and also balance of convenience, the learned single Judge granted temporary injunction. Hence, appeals were dismissed. ### (iii) ### Anchor Health and Beauty Care Pvt Ltd. vs Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co Ltd. and Ors 2014 (59) PTC 105 (Del). In this case the primary point of disagreement involved was whether the plaintiff’s mark “ALLROUND PROTECTION” was descriptive or not. The Plaintiff was the registered proprietor and owner of the mark “ALLROUND”. The Plaintiff claimed that by virtue of constantand extensive use of the mark “Anchor ALL ROUNDPROTECTION”, the mark “ALLROUND” is associated exclusively and primarily with the Plaintiff. The Defendant released a tooth paste bearing the mark ORAL-B “ALL - AROUND PROTECTION”. The Plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant to stop the Defendant from using “ALL AROUND PROTECTION” / “ALLROUNDER”. After going through the rival contentions of the parties, the Court decided that after themselves obtaining and seeking registration for the marks “ALL AROUND PROTECTION” and “ALLROUNDER” it was contrary for the Defendant to state that they are generic marks and therefore not open to the Defendant to content that the Plaintiff’s registered trademark “ALLROUND” was descriptive, generic and/or devoid of any distinctive and separate character and/or not capable of being registered. It was allowed for the Defendant to “approbate and reprobate” to the detriment of an opponent. Thus, the judgement was in favour of plaintiff. ### PROTECTION OF MARK REGISTERED FOR GOODS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION ### FOR SERVICES IF RELATED TO GOODS When the trade is applied for a good, it is seen that in most cases the protection under that trade mark would also extend to any services that are in relation to those good, since the likelihood of confusion would exist if there are two different trade marks in goods and services which are closely related to those goods. I. ### Blue Hill Logistics Private Ltd. vs. Ashok Leyland Ltd. and Ors. 2011(48) PTC 564 (Mad). Plaintiff filed suit for infringement and passing off and for various consequential relief's against Defendants. An order granting temporary injunction restraining the 1st Defendant from in any manner infringing the Plaintiff's registered trade mark "LUXURA" by use of similar mark "LUXURIA".The court held that use of the trade mark in relation to goods is distinct from the use of the trade mark in relation to services. Plaintiff has obtained the registration of the trade mark "LUXURA" under Clause 12 - "Goods". Whereas, First Defendant has applied for registration of trade mark in respect of Classes 39 and 35 - "Services". The onus is on the registered proprietor who is invoking the provisions of Section 29 of the Act to establish that the Plaintiff's mark is infringed under Sub-section (2)(a) or Sub-section (2)(b) of Section 29 of Trade Marks Act. Where the rival marks are identical and the goods or services are also identical, there is a statutory presumption of confusion and accordingly, a prima facie case of infringement would exist. The onus then shifts to the Defendant. There is no similarity or association between Plaintiff's goods i.e. buses with the mark "LUXURA" and 1st Defendant's intercity transport services i.e. "LUXURIA". Plaintiff's goods/buses are bought by bus operators, State Transport Corporation who in turn use the buses for luxurious travel of the passengers. Buyers of buses are totally different from passengers who buy bus tickets. 1st Defendant's services are enjoyed by passengers for a comfortable/luxurious intercity travel. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot complain any infringement under Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act. II. Bourjois limited vsNaunihal Singh and ors. 2013(53)PTC632(Del). In this case plaintiff is a foreign company claims to have coined and adopted the trademark BOURJOIS. The plaintiff is engaging in the business of selling cosmetic products and claims presence in over 120 countries including India. The defendant no.2 is stated to be an in-house concern of defendant no.3 and believed to be engaged in providing spa services, beauty services, manicures, pedicures, bridal spa and makeup under the name 'Bourjois Spa'. The case of the plaintiff is that the use of the mark BOURJOIS by the defendants as a trade name and trademark for running its services and as a part of its domain name constitutes infringement of its registered trademark, besides constituting passing off of their services as those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has accordingly sought injunction restraining the defendants from using, depicting or displaying the trademark and domain name BOURJOIS or any other mark which is deceptively similar to the mark of the plaintiff. The Defendants had not come forward to explain why they have chosen this particular name. So, it was held by the court that -If the product and service are closely related to each other but they also have a trade connection it would be difficult to say that the goods and services are not closely related to each other. The Defendants were passing off their services as those of the plaintiffs by using the impugned trademark/trade name for rendering saloon/spa services and as a part of their domain name. The defendants are accordingly liable to be injuncted from using the impugned trademark/trade name. III. ### Many Kagliwal and Ors. V Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, USA (2018(2)MhLJ720). The Plaintiff Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research/Mayo Clinic is doing activities under the Trade name “MAYO” since 1914. The Defendants are believed to be engaged in the business of marketing and selling pharmaceutical products under the MAYO and MAYO formative marks. The Defendant argues that origin of their mark was “MAAYOGMAYA” and they have been using the mark since 1982, therefore, are first in business. They further argue that the plaintiff is in the business of medical services while the defendant is in the business of marketing and selling pharmaceutical products. The court observed that to be "related" in the parlance of trademark law, the conflicting good or services do not have to be in competition with each others. That the goods or services are noncompetitive does not answer the question of whether the goods are so "related" that a reasonable buyer is likely to think that defendant's goods or services are somehow connected with, or sponsored by, the plaintiff, due to similar marks. There is no simple, one question test for determining whether noncompetitive products are "related" such that confusion is likely as to source, affiliation, connection or sponsorship."Related" does not mean that there is necessarily any physical relationship between the goods or services identified by the conflicting marks. Rather, it means that the marks as used are "related" in the mind of the consuming public. Goods are "related" if customers are likely to mistakenly think that the infringer's goods come from the same source as the senior user's goods or are sponsored by, affiliated with or connected with the senior user. Based on this the court observed that there is sufficient proximity between the businesses of the Defendant and the Plaintiff and dismissed the appeal ruling in favor of the plaintiff. ### MARK INFRINGED IF USED AS TRADE NAME BY ANOTHER PERSON This ratio applies to a situation where the trade mark of a company is being used as the trade name of another company. Eventually any product with the same name in the market is likely to be associated with the company, especially in cases where the good are identical. Therefore, in these situations, where the trade name of a company is so similar to the trade mark of another, a right against the infringement arises. (i) Cipla Limited v. M/s CiplaIndsutries Pvt. Ltd. 2016(67)PTC509(Bom). On August 11, 2017 the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal filed by Cipla Limited. This was against a ruling of the full bench of the Bombay High Court on theissue of the use of a registered trademark as a trade name for dissimilar goods/services, saying that it does not amount to infringemen The plaintiff, Cipla Limited, is a well-known manufacturer of pharmaceutical products which has a registration for the mark CIPLA for “pharmaceutical products” in class 5. The Defendant, registered the mark CIPLA PLAST in Class 21 for “household and kitchen utensils, containers etc.” The plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant claiming that use of their well-known registered trademark CIPLA was a part of the defendant’s corporate name, and hence, it amounted to infringement. The plaintiff further claimed that, since trademarks are inclusive by definition they should also be inclusive of the right to be able use the mark as a trade name, and hence by using Cipla Limited’s trademark as a corporate name by the defendant would tantamount to infringement. The defendant on the other hand, claimed their goods were neither similar nor identical to the plaintiff’s marks and, there was no infringement caused. The single judge held that the case of Raymond Limited v. Raymond Pharmaceuticals [2010 (44) PTC (Bom)] (Raymond), was of the view that the decision rendered in the said case—wherein an injunction had been refused to the plaintiffs whose registered trademark was being used as a corporate name by the defendants—required reconsideration and referred the matter to a larger bench. The full bench considered the interplay of relevant provisions of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, which was in regard to infringement of registered trademarks—in particular, Sections 29(4) and 29(5). By giving the provisions a literal interpretation, the bench held that in to be able to invoke Section 29(4), the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant’s mark was identical with or similar to the plaintiff’s registered trademark and was used in relation to dissimilar goods/services. Section 29(5) applied in cases where the plaintiff’s registered trademark had been used as a corporate name by the defendant with respect to same/similar goods/services. The bench affirmed that Sections 29(4) and 29(5) were mutually exclusive and no cause of action would exist when a registered trademark was used as a corporate name with respect to dissimilar goods. While the judgment is based on a literal interpretation of the law, it does affect the statutory rights of holders of well-known trademarks. That said, a passing off action may still be initiated in such scenarios. Owners of well-known marks now eagerly await the decision of the Supreme Court in the appeal. Although the matter was listed on January 4, 2018, a hearing has not yet been held. ### (ii) ### Mankind Pharma Ltd vs Chandra Mani Tiwari&Anron 6 July, 2018 2018(75)PTC8(Del). In this case the plaintiff being the fourth largest pharmaceutical company of the country, is the registered proprietor of the mark “MANKIND” in 42 different classes and has three decades used numerous marks by adding prefix or suffix to the elements MANKIND and/ or “KIND” and is also the registered owner of websites with MANKIND in their web addresses. The plaintiff while searching the records of the Trade Mark Registry, saw that the trade name ‘MERCYKIND PHARMACEUTICALS PRIVATE LIMITED’ (Defendant No.2) belonged to Chandra Mani Tiwari (Defendant No.-1) who was the director of defendant no-2. The defendant no 2 who had been doing business under the trademark such as ‘MERCYMOX’, ‘MERCYCOUGH’ and ‘MERCYCOPE’. Therefore, the plaintiff brought the instant suit against the defendants before the Delhi high court for permanent restraining the defendants from using or infringing the plaintiff’s trade mark/tradename ‘MANKIND’ and series of marks with the suffix/prefix ‘KIND’ and from passing off their business /goods as that of the plaintiff by way of adopting and using the trade name ‘MERCYKIND PHARMACEUTICAL PRIVATE LIMITED’. The primary issue that had been brought up in this case was whether the defendant is guilty of infringing the plaintiff’s trademark and passing off of was the use of the the work “KIND” by the Plaintiff for their goods. In this regard, the court held that there was no case of prima facie infringement under clauses (1) to (4) of Section 29 of Trade Marks Act, 1999 as had been made out since the mark MERCYKIND was not used as trademark by the defendant. The Court for this purpose observed that pharmaceutical/medicinal products of the defendant were not named MERCYKIND. It rejected the contention of the plaintiff that use of MERCYKIND even in the name of defendant’s company, is used as a trade mark. The Court held that mere affixation of the name of the defendant company as manufacturer or marketer of the drugs/medicines sold by the defendants, would not be sufficient use as a trade mark, even under Section 29(6).Similarly, they held that that use of registered trademark as trade name or part of trade name was absent, the Court held that there was no infringement under clause (5) of Section 29. It was held that just by virtue of the fact that MERCYKIND may be deceptively similar to MANKIND or any other registered trade mark of plaintiff with KIND as prefix or suffix, would not amount to infringement under Section 29(5). ### (iii) ### Kala Niketan v/s kalaNiketan AIR 1983 Delhi 161, ILR 1981 Delhi 592 (Kala ### Niketan Case) 1981 PTC 213 Plaintiff carried on business of dealing in and selling sarees under the Trade Name ‘Kala Niketan’. The Plaintiff had given wide publicity to its Trade Name ‘Kala Niketan’ through newspapers, radio, boarding and other media, and there was huge market for the sarees of the Plaintiff. The Defendant being aware of the popularity of the Plaintiff’s name, adopted the same Trade Name and started business in sarees. The Defendant was served with a notice in December 1977 to stop using the Trade Name ‘Kala Niketan’ but the Defendant did not stop the usage. Further, the Defendant published a caution notice in the Indian Express, dated May 13, 1978 claiming that Defendant firm was the proprietor of the name ‘Kala Niketan’ in respect of trade of all kinds of Sarees and textiles. In the subsequent case, the Court found that the adoption of the Trade Name ‘Kala Niketan’ by the Defendant was to ride on the popularity of the Plaintiff’s Trade Name and granted a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from dealing in Sarees and other textile goods in the name of ‘Kala Niketan’ or any other identical or deceptively similar Trade Name. ### (iv) ### Atlas Cycles (Haryana) Ltd. vs Atlas Products Pvt. Ltd. 2008 (36) PTC 269 ### Del (Atlas Case) The Plaintiff, M/s. Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Limited, a public limited company, filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from using Plaintiff’s registered Trade Mark ‘Atlas’ as Defendant’s Trade Mark or as part of its corporate Trade name. The Defendant introduced the Trade Mark ‘House of Atlas’ for its bicycles in such a way that the word ‘Atlas’ appeared in a conspicuous fashion whereas words “House of” was depicted in a smaller font which gave a dominant exposure to the word ‘Atlas’. The Court in this case found the Defendant used the said Trade Mark to deceive and confuse the public as to the origin of goods and therefore held against the Defendant. However the court did not restrain the Defendant from using the said Trade Name. The court instead went against the Plaintiff’s reasoning that the Plaintiff had raised this issue after 7 years of incorporation of the Defendant Company and that if an injunction is granted, it will cause serious prejudice to the Defendant. The Court held that restraining the Defendant from using its corporate name at this juncture, which it has nurtured for the last more than seven years, would result in a “civil death” for the Defendant. (v) ### Raymond Ltd v Raymond Pharmaceuticals 2010 (44) PTC (Bom) In this case the Plaintiff was Raymond Ltd. dealt in fabric, brought about a suit against Raymond Pharma who were incorporated in 1983 and who were in the business of manufacturing and marketing of medicine. The Plaintiff objected to the use of the mark “RAYMOND” by the defendant as their domain name and other business purposes, since they had adopted the mark 80 years ago, it was an essential feature of their trade mark, and have over the years become well known. The defendant claimed that and that they had using the mark as their corporate name for healthcare products for very long. In this case the Division bench and the Single judge bench of Bombay high Court favoured the defendant by pointing out that they were for different goods, and operated in completely different fields. They also held that the domain name of the Defendant incorporates part of its corporate name and the corporate name of the Defendant is not actionable as infringement of the mark. ### -DISCLAIMER- It is to be noted that the above illustration is provided to the reader for reference and understanding. It does not constitute legal opinion in any manner whatsoever. While summarizing portions of judgments, maximum and honest effort has been taken to maintain the same effect and interpretation of the summarized text. However, due to linguistic, grammatical and expressive deviations from the original text required for the summary, interpretation and effect may not be absolutely congruent. References used for judgments for the purpose of this document, were reliable and ordinarily known to be accurate and it is believed that information provided therein is true to the best of our knowledge. If however, there is any discrepancy or inaccuracy therewith, Khurana and Khurana disclaims any liability thereto, but invites the readers to highlight the same so that it can be checked and if relevant, rectified in this document.

OnLine SC 1490. 9. Recovery of money illegally collected from the public by contemnors: In suspected case of fictitious deposit scheme involving tens of thousands of crores of rupees, detailed directions issued, for creation of mechanism under stewardship of retired Supreme Court Judge for refund of amounts illegally collected by appellant Companies with 15% interest p.a. from date of receipt of subscription amount till date of refund to SEBI by appellant Sahara Companies, SEBI v. Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 1 SCC 1. A definite course of action is to be chartered before question of redemption/refund to subscribers is considered, namely, in the first instance it is obligatory on the part of the contemnors/applicants to deposit the entire balance amount along with interest accrued thereon in SEBI Sahara Refund Account. This obligation has to be performed in all circumstances. It is only thereafter, if and when the applicants/contemnors are able to substantiate the factum of redemption, that they would be entitled to refund of said amount to the extent they are able to prove in this behalf, SEBI v. Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 48. Court is not powerless as it can always direct sale of properties of the Sahara Companies to ensure recovery of amount concerned as value of the properties is stated to be much higher. However, it is not done so far pursuant to the wishes of applicants/contemnors who have pleaded against sale of these properties by the Court with repeated assurances that these Companies would be taking necessary steps for generating the desired finances and the Court has accepted their request and given them opportunities and chances to do, SEBI v. Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 48. 10. Coal ### Block ### Allocation Scam.—Regarding issues arising under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 in respect of 43 companies, Directorate of Enforcement directed to file Status Report and CBI directed to file progress report, Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, (2017) 11 SCC 731 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 371. 11. Effect of amendment.—The amended provisions of the PML Act, as amended by the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009, would come into operation on the appointed date, that is, 1-6-2009. All the offences allegedly committed by the writ petitioner were earlier to the insertion of the provision in the schedule of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009, and as such, they have no application. Therefore, the Enforcement Case Information Report and the order of attachment are without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed, Obulapuram Mining Co. (P)

1. 8. Proceeds of crime.—Handing over cash to a public servant would be considered “proceeds of crime” under the Prevention of Money Laundering

of Enforcement, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 2304 : ILR 2017 KAR 1846. 12. Offences under PML Act, 2002.—Offences under the Act are cognizable in nature. “Scheduled offence” is a sine qua non for offence of money- laundering, P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24. 13. Prosecution for offences — Maintainability — Requirements.—It is the duty of court to look into the allegations and the material collected in support thereto and determine whether prima facie offence(s) under the PMLA are made out. Standard of proof for conviction for offences under Sections 3 and 4 is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, J. Sekar v. Enforcement Directorate, (2022) 7 SCC 370. 14. Money laundering.—If a person has been involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of the crime, it would be sufficient to prosecute him under this Section, Benoy

Directorate, (2023) 5 HCC (Del) 353. 15. Constitutional validity.—Delhi High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the second proviso to Section 5(1) of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which empowers the Enforcement Directorate to provisionally attach the properties allegedly bought from proceed of time, J. Sekar v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6523. 16. Stages of attachment.—Order of attachment passes through three different stages (i) provisional order under Section 5(1); (ii) confirmation of provisional order under Section 8(3); and (iii) finality of order of attachment under Section 8(3)(b), A. Kamarunnisa Ghori v. Chairperson, Prevention of Money Laundering, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2527. 17. Notice.—If there is urgent/immediate necessity that unless and until property involved is not attached at once, it may frustrate proceedings under the Act, a notice prior to Provisional Attachment is not required, M.

2583. 18. Claim of third party.—Once property is attached and adjudicating authority confirms attachment adjudicating authority has no choice except to await verdict of criminal court. Such property would be restored to accused if he is acquitted or confiscated to Central Government if accused is convicted. Act does not provide any mechanism to third party to claim such property and victim of fraud whose money is traceable to such property cannot stake claim. Adjudicating Authority cannot act under Sections 5, 8 and 9 to deny rights of victim of fraud, Indian Bank v. Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Deptt. of Revenue, Directorate of Enforcement, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2526. 19. Expression “reason to believe”.—The term “reason to believe” is not defined in the PML Act, 2002. The expression “reason to believe” has been defined in Section 26 IPC. As per the definition in Section 26 IPC, a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise, P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24. 20. Interpretation/Construction.—Object of attachment under the Act is to ensure that proceedings for confiscation of proceeds of crime, are not frustrated. Government can, by retaining symbolic, legal and constructive possession of property attached, ensure that proceedings for confiscation are not frustrated. Any alienation of attached property after entry in the records of Sub-Registrar would be null and void. Thus, merely because “physical possession” is retained by person accused of scheduled offences, it would not mean that confiscation proceedings would be frustrated. Section 5(4) clearly manifests that nothing in section shall prevent person interested in property from “enjoyment of immovable property”, A. Kamarunnisa

of Enforcement, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2526. 22. Fictitious deposit scheme.—In the suspected case of fictitious deposit scheme involving tens of thousands of crores of rupees, detailed directions issued, for creation of mechanism under stewardship of retired Supreme Court Judge for refund of amounts illegally collected by appellant Companies with 15% interest per annum from date of receipt of subscription amount till date of refund to SEBI by appellant-Sahara Companies. Further directed that if Sahara fails to comply with these directions and do not effect refund of money as directed, SEBI to take recourse to all legal remedies including attachment and sale of properties, freezing of bank accounts, etc. for realization of amounts. SEBI also directed to then locate genuine depositor/investors (if any) and refund money to them and unclaimed amounts to be appropriated to Government of India, Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2013) 1 SCC 1 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 257. 23. Interpretation/Construction.—The word “seize” has to be construed to mean taking physical possession as in case of taking actual possession of movable property. Nemichand Jain v. Superintendent of Central Excise and Customs, Silchar, (1963) 2 Cri LJ 288. 24. Freezing of bank account.—Necessary requirements and prerequisites of freezing of property or record and freezing of bank account, summarized, OPTO Circuits (India) Ltd. v. Axis Bank, (2021) 6 SCC 707. 25. Appearance before Magistrate.—The Supreme Court has strongly urged upon the State and its police authorities to see that this constitutional and legal requirement to produce an arrested person before a Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest must be scrupulously observed. The healthy provision enables the magistrates to keep a check over the police investigation and it is necessary that the magistrates should try to enforce this requirement and where it is found disobeyed, come down heavily upon the police. Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 228. 26. Duty to inform grounds of arrest.—Informing the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 of PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, Ram Kishor

Mad 2527. 21. Opportunity of hearing.—Adjudicating authority should hear persons aggrieved and has to afford opportunity to Bank, whose funds had been utilized for acquisition of property by practicing criminal fraud, Indian

Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1. 27. Documents for grounds of arrest.—Enforcement Directorate's action of not furnishing a copy of the document containing the grounds of the arrest after the arrestee having endorsed and read the same, at the time of arrest does not render the arrest illegal under Section 19 of the PMLA, Ram Kishor Arora v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 599. 28. ECIR distinguished from FIR.—Supply of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory. If ED at the time of arrest, contemporaneously discloses the grounds of such arrest to such person is enough. ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of the CrPC. Revealing a copy of an ECIR, if made mandatory, may defeat the purpose sought to be achieved by the PMLA including frustrating the attachment of property (proceeds of crime). Non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an internal document of ED, cannot be cited as violation of constitutional right, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1. 29. Onus to prove.—Burden of proof of general exception is on the accused. Such burden can be discharged by showing a preponderance of probabilities, Bhupendrasinh A. Chudasama v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 2 SCC 603 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 668. 30. Reversal of burden of proof under Section 24.—Section 24, PMLA provides that unless contrary is proved, court shall presume that proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering and burden to prove that proceeds of crime are not involved lies on accused. As accused have not discharged said burden, condition for grant of bail under Section 45(1)(ii), PMLA not satisfied. It is not expected at this stage that the guilt of accused should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Allegations may not ultimately be established, but having been made, burden of proof that monies were not proceeds of crime and were not tainted, therefore, shifted onto accused persons under Section 24, PMLA. Investigation revealed that crores of money collected from general public from multiple States were illegally invested elsewhere. Appellant floated as many as 27 companies to allure investors on promise of high returns and funds collected from public were laundered in associated companies for purchasing movable and immovable properties. High Court while specifically refusing to grant bail at this stage duly considered statements of witnesses (officer-bearers of the company) and seizure list. Thus there is no reason to interfere with impugned order of High Court refusing bail, Gautam

of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), (2015) 16 SCC 1 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 603. 31. Independence of Judiciary.—When some of the provisions of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and Rules framed thereunder were challenged the Supreme Court held that Government while creating a new judicial forum, has to ensure that independence of judiciary and separation of powers is maintained, Pareena Swaroop v. Union of India, (2008) 14 SCC 107. 32. Territorial jurisdiction of Special Court — Determination of.—Law clarified on the issue that whether the trial of offence of money-laundering should follow the trial of the scheduled/predicate offence or vice versa, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2023) 4 SCC 357. 33. Joint Trial.—Section 44(1) Expln. (i) clarifies that the trial of scheduled offence and offence of money-laundering by the same court cannot be construed as joint trial, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2023) 4 SCC 357. 34. Applicability of provisions of CrPC.—Provisions of the CrPC are applicable to all proceedings under the 2002 Act including proceedings before the Special Court, except to the extent they are specifically excluded by the 2002 Act, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2023) 4 SCC 357. 35. Special Court which has jurisdiction — Determination.—Irrespective of where the FIR relating to the Scheduled Offence was filed and irrespective of which court took cognizance of the Scheduled Offence, the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Special Court to take cognizance of a compliant under PMLA should be decided with reference to the place/places where any one of the activities/processes which constitute the offence under Section 3 took place, KA Rauf Sherif v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2023) 6 SCC 92. 36. Applicability of Section 197(1) of CrPC.—Section 197(1) of the CrPC is applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of PMLA, unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1), Enforcement Directorate v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, (2025) 1 SCC 404. 37. Jurisdiction for investigation.—Investigation under 2002 Act is exclusively within jurisdiction and domain of Enforcement

3 SCC (Cri) 217. 38. Mandatory conditions under Sections 45(1)(i) & (ii), Prevention of ### Money-Laundering Act, 2002 for grant of bail, held, applicable to bail application under Section 439 CrPC in cases to which PMLA applies.— Firstly, provisions of special statute like PMLA dealing with economic offences would prevail over a general statute like CrPC in case of conflict [Section 5 CrPC]. Secondly, Section 45, PMLA starts with a non obstante clause and would thus have an overriding effect on CrPC. Thirdly, mandate of Sections 65 and 71, PMLA regarding overriding effect of PMLA over CrPC strengthen the applicability of Section 45, PMLA to a proceeding under Section 439 CrPC, Gautam Kundu v. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money-Laundering Act), (2015) 16 SCC 1 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 603. 39. Pre-trial bail.—Pre-trial bail provision under Section 45 imposing twin stringent conditions under Section 45(1) for offences classified thereunder, is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory and invalid. It contravenes

India, (2018) 11 SCC 1. 40. Grant of bail.—Two threshold conditions for, stipulated under Section 45 mandatory and must be complied with even in respect of bail application under Section 439 CrPC as Section 45 overrides general provisions of CrPC, Court's approach in considering bail applications to which Section 45 is attracted, explained, Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2018) 11 SCC 46. 41. Section 45 of PML Act will have overriding effect on general provisions of Criminal Procedure Code in case of conflict between them. Section 45 of PML Act imposes conditions for grant of bail. Bail cannot be granted without complying with requirements of Section 45 of PML Act, Union of India v. Varinder Singh, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1314. 42. Self-incriminating statement.—A statement given by an accused, while under custody in a case under the PMLA, incriminating oneself in another money laundering case would be inadmissible in evidence, Prem Prakash v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 9 SCC 787. 43. Scheduled offence.—An accused in the PMLA case who comes into picture after the scheduled offence is committed by assisting in the concealment or use of proceeds of crime need not be an accused in the scheduled offence and such an accused can still be prosecuted under PMLA so long as scheduled offence exists, Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate, (2023) 15 SCC 91. 44. Necessity to arrest.—Section 45 gives primacy to the opinion of Directorate of Enforcement when it comes to grant of bail. ED should act uniformly, consistent in conduct, confirming one rule for all, Arvind Kejriwal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2025) 2 SCC 248. 45. Material on record.—Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the PMLA can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty, Arvind Kejriwal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2025) 2 SCC 248. 46. Eligibility.—(a) By conjointly and harmoniously construing Section 46, 2002 Act with Sections 24 and 2(u) CrPC, (b) reasonably construing expression “under” in Section 46(2), 2002 Act, and (c) examining nature, status and independence of office of Public Prosecutor, indicative of public nature of such office, held, lawyers in panel of either State or Central Government are eligible for appointment for conducting trial of offences under Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 117 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 61. 47. Appeal.—An appeal is a continuation of a suit or proceeding wherein the entire proceedings are again left open for consideration by the appellate authorities which has the power to review the entire evidence subject, of course, to the prescribed statutory limitation. But in the case of revision, whatever powers the revisional authority may have, it has no power to reassess and reappreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of revision. Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201. 48. Evidence for Issuing Summons.—Summons issued by Enforcement Directorate cannot be quashed merely because relevant documents required for purpose of investigation have not been specified, Talib Hassan Darvesh v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 1 HCC (Del) 93. 49. Interpretation/Construction.—The word ‘inves tigation’ c cannot be limited only to police investigation but on the other hand, the said word is with wider connotation and flexible so as to include the investigation carried on by any agency whether he be a police officer or empowered or authorised officer or a person not being a police officer under the direction of a Magistrate to make an investigation vested with the power of investigation. Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 785. 50. Cognizance, meaning and scope.—The word ‘co gnizance’ h has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law or procedure. It merely means to become aware of and when used with reference to a court or Judge, to take notice of judicially. “Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action; or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.” Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 80. 51. The word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the exercise of juri sdiction’ or ‘power to try and determine caus es’. . In common parlance it means taking notice of. State of Maharashtra v. Budhikota Subbarao (Dr), (1993) 3 SCC 339 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 901. 52. The word ‘co gnizance’ i indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid, (1995) 1 SCC 684 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 266. 53. Cognizance of offence.—As to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search- warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Section 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance. Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 39. 54. Applicability of CrPC, 1973 with respect to arrest, search and seizure, etc..—Section 167 CrPC is fully applicable to arrests made under Section 19 PMLA. Law clarified on applicability of CrPC, 1973 with respect to arrest, search and seizure, etc., V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51. 55. Applicability of provisions of PML Act vis-à-vis provisions of other Acts.—Provisions of PML Act must prevail over contrary provisions of other Acts. Provisions of CrPC would apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with provisions of PML Act, P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24. 56. Rule making power, nature and scope.—Where the Act conferred rule- making power for carrying out the provisions of the chapter, held, rules could not be so framed as not to carry out the purpose of the chapter or to be in conflict with. Laghu Udyog Bharati v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 418. 57. Conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto. ADM (Revenue) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451.

1831; State of Maharasthra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah, (2000) 2 SCC 699 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 533, explained and distinguished. 11. While construing the definition of “public servant” in clause (c) of Section 2 of the 1988 Act, the Court should adopt a purposive approach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature, Govt. of A.P. v. P. Venku Reddy, (2002) 7 SCC 631 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1826. 12. Member of Parliament is a “public servant”, P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1108; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172, distinguished; Habibulla Khan v. State of Orissa, 1993 Cri LJ 3604 : (1993) 3 Crimes 198, approved. 13. The expression “public servant” used in the Act is undoubtedly wide enough to denote every Judge, including Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court, K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. 14. Term “university” — Scope.— A “deemed university” and the officials therein, do not perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a university simpliciter, and the officials therein. Hence, a “deemed university”, falls within the ambit of the term “university” under Section 2(c)(xi) and its officials, fall within definition of “public servant” under the PC Act, 1988, State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360. 15. Public duty — Meaning.— Any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at large has any interest is called a public duty, State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360. 16. Power of State Legislature to establish Special Courts.—Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 specifically deals with offences under Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and provides for Special Courts for trial of said offences. While under the PC Act, 1988, State in ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale any case has authority to appoint Special Judges in respect of all offences under PC Act, 1988, not violative of Article 247, Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 1. 17. Appointment of Special Judge.—Government can appoint a Special Judge for an area or areas and can also appoint a Special Judge for a case or group of cases within that area, Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 670. 18. Validity of Section 3(1).—Section 3(1), not unguided, arbitrary or discriminatory and not violative of Articles 14 and 21, J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 670. 19. Jurisdiction and power of Special Judge.—Scope and jurisdiction of special Judge appointed under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to try all offences connected/related to/committed as part of same set of transactions for which public officials are charged under PC Act, explained, HCL Infosystem Ltd. v. CBI, (2016) 9 SCC 281 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 587 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 438. 20. Allocation of cases.—Allocation or distribution of the cases among the Special Judges is purely an administrative act and hence that could be done by an Acting Chief Justice and even if that is considered as an irregularity that is not of such magnitude as to require Supreme Court's intervention, J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 670. 21. Speedy trial.—Speedy trial of corruption cases against public servants/officers holding high government offices being a relevant consideration it cannot be said that by appointing separate Special Judges for speedier trial of those cases the Government has either singled out cases against its political opponents or that the power has been exercised by the Government for political targeting, J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 670. 22. Under appointment of Special Judge.—High Court can nominate officer(s) of rank of District Judge for appointment and posting as Special

High Court, (2013) 8 SCC 1 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 744. 23. General Assam Rifles Court.—General Assam Rifles Court (GARC), has jurisdiction to try offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, against members of Assam Rifles. Section 4 of PC Act is not irreconcilable with Section 55 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 to such extent that they cannot stand together, Union of India v. Ranjit Kumar Saha, (2019) 7 SCC 505. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 24. Scope of Section 4(2).—Section 4(2) is not subject to provisions of CrPC, CBI v. Braj Bhushan Prasad, (2001) 9 SCC 432. 25. The word ‘case’ in second part of sub-section (2) includes ‘cases’. Hence when a Special Judge or Judges is/are appointed for a case or group of cases then only that Special Judge can hear those cases, J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999) 5 SCC 138 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 670. 26. Jurisdiction of Special Judge.—A Special Judge is not precluded altogether from trying any other offence, other than offence specified in Section 3 thereof. A person charged of an offence under the Act may in view of sub-section (3) of Section (4) be charged at the same trial of any offence under any other law with which he may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, be charged at the same trial. Thus a public servant who is charged of an offence under the provisions of the Act may be charged by the Special Judge at the same trial of any offence under IPC if the same is committed in a manner contemplated by Section 220 of the Code, Vivek Gupta v. CBI, (2003) 8 SCC 628. 27. 2G spectrum cases.—Though petitioners (accused persons) not charged under PC Act, 1988 neither for conspiracy nor for abetment to commit offences under PC Act, 1988 but only for offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC but in course of same transaction for which public officials charged under PC Act, 1988 and in course of 2G Spectrum Scam transactions. They can be tried together with other co-accused of 2G Scam case who are charged under PC Act, 1988, Essar Teleholdings Ltd. v. Delhi High Court, (2013) 8 SCC 1 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 744. 28. Disproportionate assets case.—In disproportionate assets case, sole public servant (A-1) died and case against her abated but conviction, sentence, confiscation and forfeiture orders against the rest, held, sustainable, thus, resorted, State of Karnataka v. J. Jayalalitha, (2017) 6 SCC 263 : (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 179 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 1. 29. Cognizance of cases.—Alternatives available for cognizance of cases triable under PC Act, 1988 are (A) normal route via Magistrate and then committal to Special Judge, or (B) direct cognizance by Special Judge permitted under Section 5(1) of PC Act, 1988, State v. V. Arul Kumar, (2016) 11 SCC 733 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 715 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 381. 30. Powers of Special Judge.—Special Judge can deal with a case even during pendency of police investigation and prior to taking cognizance of the offence. Special Judge can exercise all the power of Sessions Judge as provided under the CrPC in relation to the proceeding under the P.C. Act ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale of 1988 so far they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Consequently, the grant of anticipatory bail or regular bail is within the exclusive power of Special Judge. Ravi Nandan Sahay, In re, 1993 Cri LJ 2436 (FB). 31. Power of Special Judge to tender pardon in terms of Section 306 CrPC, held, not affected by deeming provision in Section 5(2) regarding pardon to approver in terms of Section 307 CrPC. Deeming clause in Section 5(2) is for limited purpose mentioned therein viz. that pardon tendered by Special Judge would be deemed to be tendered under Section 307 CrPC. It is not to fetter power of Special Judge to grant pardon in terms of Section 306 CrPC. Section 5(2) of PC Act clearly confers power to grant pardon under Section 306 CrPC subject to the deeming clause, Bangaru Laxman v. State, (2012) 1 SCC 500 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 422 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 487. 32. Jurisdiction.—It is no doubt true that the policy under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of a public servant. But if the accused ceases to be a public servant and loses his protective cover under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or Section 197 CrPC and is open to prosecution without sanction having to be obtained, it would also necessarily mean that the Special Judge under the Special Courts Act, 1949, would cease to have jurisdiction over the accused in terms of

Banerjee, (2008) 9 SCC 45 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 671. 33. Applicability of rule of ejusdem generis.—It is not correct to assume that Section 6(1) of the Act should be read ejusdem generis so as to apply it only to such public servants where there is relationship of master and servant between them and their employer. The provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act cover certain categories of public servants and the ‘other’. The structure of the section does not permit the applicability of the rule of ejusdem generis, K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. Essential ingredients.—The essential ingredients of Section 7 are: (i) That the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant; (ii) That he should accept the gratification for himself and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function, favour or disfavour to any person, A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587. In corruption cases, prosecution must prove both demand and acceptance of bribe amount, V. Kannan v. State, (2009) 9 SCC 87.

any rule of universal application. If trap, recovery of money and chemical test are established and prosecution version relating to demand and acceptance of bribe stands by itself, ratio in Hari Dev Sharma case not applicable, State of A.P. v. M. Radha Krishna Murthy, (2009) 5 SCC 117. Demand and voluntary acceptance of amount of illegal gratification are essential ingredients. Mere recovery of currency notes not sufficient to constitute offence, C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1. When minimum sentence prescribed under statute has been awarded by courts below, Supreme Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct further reduction of sentence on ground of such unwarranted sympathy. Even if amount is meagre, corruption deserves no sympathy or leniency, Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 80 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 343. 34. Taking bribe.—Section 7 (before substitution) Defence to the charge of—Member of Tender Committee charged with demanding and accepting money from the party submitting tender—The mere fact that they were not the final authority in the tender matter, held, could not negate the said charge, State of A.P. v. C. Uma Maheshwara Rao, (2004) 4 SCC 399. Mere recovery of tainted money in absence of any proof of demand and acceptance, cannot be said to be sufficient to convict the accused, N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N., (2021) 3 SCC 687. 35. Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.—If demand and acceptance of bribe by a public servant has been proved in a trap case then the accused is liable for punishment under the Section 7, R. Sundararajan v. State, (2006) 12 SCC 749. 36. Every acceptance of illegal gratification, whether preceded by a demand or not, would be covered by Section 7 of the Act. But if the acceptance of an illegal gratification is in pursuance of a demand by the public servant, ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale then it would also fall under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, State v. A. Parthiban, (2006) 11 SCC 473. 37. Where it was held that when an amount is found to have been passed to the public servant then the burden is on public servant to establish that it was not by way of illegal gratification. When it is proved that there was voluntary and conscious acceptance of money by the accused, there is no further burden cast on the prosecution to prove by direct evidence, the demand or motive and it has only to be deduced from the facts and circumstances obtained in the particular case, B. Noha v. State of Kerala, (2006) 12 SCC 277. 38. In a case involving offence of demanding and accepting illegal gratification, depending on circumstances of case, it may be safe to accept prosecution version on basis of oral evidence of complainant and official witnesses, even if trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When besides such evidence, there is circumstantial evidence, which is consistent with guilt of accused and inconsistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding conviction, Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88. 39. Offence under — When established.—Offence under Section 7 relating to public servants taking bribe requires proof of: (a) demand of illegal gratification, and (b) acceptance thereof. Proof of demand of bribe by public servant and its acceptance by him, both are a sine qua non for establishing offence under Section 7, K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana, (2022) 4 SCC 574. 40. Illegal gratification.—Law clarified on permissibility of drawing inferential deduction of guilt of public servant in absence of direct evidence of demand of illegal gratification, Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731. 41. Quashment of FIR/investigation in PC Act/corruption cases.— Principles clarified relating to approach to be adopted by the Court in FIR/investigation in PC Act/corruption cases, State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh, (2023) 6 SCC 559. 42. Possession and Recovery of Currency Notes.—Mere possession and recovery of currency notes from the accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, Mohan v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 1 HCC (Bom) 1. 43. Section 6 — Grant of Sanction.— Court must see that sanctioning authority was aware of facts of the offence while giving sanction as any ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale fact arising after the resolution is passed is wholly irrelevant. Grant of sanction is a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government officers against frivolous prosecutions and must be strictly complied with, Mohan v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 1 HCC (Bom) 1. 44. Section 4(1) — Condition for Legal Presumption.— Unless prosecution proves that the money paid was not towards any lawful collection or legal remuneration, the Court cannot take recourse to the presumption of law contemplated in this Section, though preclusion has not been made from drawing appropriate presumption as envisaged in Section 114 of Evidence Act, 1872, Mohan v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 1 HCC (Bom) 1. 45. Applicability.—If Section 8 is analytically dissected then it would read as below: (i) whoever (ii) accepts or obtains gratification from any person (iii) for inducing any public servant (by corrupt or illegal means) (iv) to render or attempt to render any services or disservice (etc.) (v) with any public servant (etc.) If a public servant accepts gratification for inducing any public servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, etc. then he would fall in the net of Sections 8 and 9, Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1. 46. Interpretation/Construction.—The opening word of Sections 8 and 9 is “whoever”. The expression is very wide and would also cover public servants accepting gratification as a motive or reward for inducing any other public servant by corrupt or illegal means. Restricting the operation of the expression by curtailing the ambit of Sections 8 and 9 and confining to private persons would not reflect the actual legislative intention, Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1. 47. Pecuniary gratification.—“Gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratification, Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1. 48. Benefit of doubt.—If there are discrepancies in prosecution case under Section 12 then the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt, Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 493. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 49. Sanction for prosecution.—Previous sanction under Section 19 is not necessary to take cognizance under Section 12. Omission of Section 12 from Section 19, is deliberate which is also apparent from fact that for convicting any person under Section 12, actual commission of offence under Section 7 or Section 11 is of no consequence, State v. Parmeshwaran Subramani, (2009) 9 SCC 729. 50. Abetment of or conspiracy for obtaining illegal gratification.— Absence of direct evidence for demand and acceptance or conspiracy, held, irrelevant if circumstantial evidence unhesitatingly points towards accessory accused (appellants in present case) as being part of design for obtaining illegal gratification. Further held, once the circumstantial evidence establishes design for obtaining illegal gratification, presumption under Section 20 would arise, Guruviah v. State, (2019) 8 SCC 396. 51. Burden of proof.—Two postulates must combine together for crystalization into the offence, namely, possession of property or resources disproportionate to the known sources of income of public servant and the inability of the public servant to account for it/them. Burden of proof regarding the first limb is on the prosecution whereas the onus is on the public servant to prove the second limb, P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1133. 52. Interpretation/Construction.—The expression “known sources of income” used in Section 13(1) (e) (prior to substitution), held, does not mean sources known to the accused, but sources known to the prosecution. The burden is on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance. Held, though “income” is receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake the character of income. Whatever a public servant gets from his service and by way of regular receipts from (a) his property, or (b) his investment, held, will be his income, State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353 53. The meaning of words obtaining “pecuniary advantage” explained, Delhi Administration v. S.N. Khosla, (1971) 1 SCC 872 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 370. 54. The “known sources of income” should be “any lawful source”. The receipt of such income should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of any law applicable to such public servant at the relevant time, P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1133. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 55. Though “income” is receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake the character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return he gets from his service, will be the primary item of his income. Other incomes which conceivably are income qua the public servant, will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment, State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353. 56. The term “known source of income” under Section 13(1)(e) would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused, State v. R. Soundirarasu, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1150. 57. Maximum sentence.— In terms of Section 13(2) [as amended by Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 for offence, minimum sentence that can be imposed has been increased from 1 to 4 years, and maximum sentence from 7 to 10 years. Even if the accused is not within purview of 2013 Act, but he can certainly be prosecuted and punished under Section 13(1), PC Act, Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67. 58. Validity of Section 6-A of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. — Section 6-A, Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 does not satisfy the well-settled tests in context of Article 14 of Constitution and is not capable of severance for the purposes of Sections 13(1)(d)(ii) and (iii). Hence, Section 6-A (as inserted. by Act 45 of 2003), held invalid, Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42. 59. Validity of sanction for prosecution.—Consideration of validity of sanction at stage of discharge, in revision by High Court, held, erroneous and conclusion reached unsustainable. Absence of sanction no doubt can be agitated at the threshold, but invalidity of sanction can be considered only during trial, CBI v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal, (2020) 17 SCC 664. 60. Disproportionate assets.—In order to establish that a public servant is in possession of pecuniary resources and property, disproportionate to his known sources of income, it is not imperative that the period of reckoning be spread out for the entire stretch of anterior service of the public servant. There can be no general rule or criterion, valid for all cases, in the regard to the choice of the period for which accounts are taken to establish criminal misconduct. It is for the prosecution of choose what, according to it, is the period which having regard to the acquisitive activities of the public servant in amassing wealth, characterise and ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale isolate that period for special scrutiny, State of Maharashtra v. Pollonji Darabshaw Daruwalla, 1987 Supp SCC 379, 384, 385. 61. Evidentiary value of income tax returns/orders while quantification of assets, expenditure and income during the check period, determined, State of Karnataka v. J. Jayalalitha, (2017) 6 SCC 263 : (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 179 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 1. 62. Criminal misconduct by public servant.—As accused abused her position as public servant entrusted with management and control of Noida (modern industrial city), committing gross irregularities in allotment and conversion of land in Noida itself, for herself and her daughters, she is, held, guilty of obtaining valuable thing for herself and her daughters by abusing her position as a public servant. Appellant not only gained pecuniary advantage for herself by manipulating rules of Noida Authority, but also caused grave loss to Noida Authority. Her conviction is confirmed, Neeraj Yadav v. CBI, (2017) 8 SCC 757 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 515. 63. Persons guilty of grave offences under IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act during service period cannot get immunity from prosecution even after retirement, State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, 1989 SCC (Cri) 128. 64. It is sufficient if the accused is able to prove his case by the standard of preponderance of probabilities as envisaged by Section 5 of the Evidence Act as a result of which he succeeds not because he proves his case to the hilt but because probability of the version given by him throws doubt on the prosecution case and, therefore, the prosecution cannot be said to have established the charge beyond reasonable doubt, Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 566. 65. When once the accused comes into possession of the tainted money the only inference is that he accepted the same and thus ‘obtained the pecuniary advantage’, M.W. Mohiuddin v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 SCC 567 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 546. 66. Where the facts stated in the General Diary entry recorded on the basis of a telephonic information were (i) that the respondent was a corrupt official and was in the habit of accepting illegal gratification (bribe), (ii) that he had demanded and accepted case to the tune of rupees one lakh approximately, and (iii) that he would be carrying with him the said amount while going to a particular place by a particular mode on a particular date, held, a cognizable offence under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was clearly made out. Hence the SP, ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale CBI rightly proceeded to intercept the respondent and investigate the case, Supdt. of Police v. Tapan Kr. Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175. 67. Burden lies on prosecution to prove that the public servant possesses pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income—Limited onus then shifts on the public servant to explain to the satisfaction of the court the disproportionality of the assets possessed by him—Onus can be discharged by balance of probabilities (Per Shetty and

144 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 637 and Ch. Gopala Rao v. Southern Power Distribution Co. of A.P. Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine AP 73. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 74. Ingredients.—To constitute an offence under Section 13(1)(c) (prior to substitution), it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused has dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated any property entrusted to him or under his control, K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala, (2005) 12 SCC 631. 75. To attract provisions of Section 13(1)(d) (prior to substitution) a public servant should obtain for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage: (i) by corrupt or illegal means, or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, or (iii) without any public interest, R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha, (2004) 2 SCC 9 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 377. (See also A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587. 76. CBI investigation.—State has a larger obligation i.e. to maintain law and order, public order and preservation of peace and harmony in the society. When serious allegations are made against a former Minister of the State, save and except the cases of political revenge amounting to malice, the State may consider handing over of investigation to CBI which has acquired specialisation in such cases, Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441. 77. Preliminary enquiry — Permissibility.—Enquiry at pre-FIR stage, held, not only permissible but desirable. However, such a preliminary enquiry would be permissible only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not and only thereafter FIR would be registered. However, such enquiry cannot be a fishing or roving enquiry, Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 469. 78. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a source information report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may be avoided, State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 382. 79. Disproportionate assets.—Principles clarified re “known sources of income” under Section 13(1)(e) PC Act, 1988, and stage at which onus to account satisfactorily for the money to be discharged by accused, State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 80. Illegal Investigation.—Illegality in investigation, unless shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice, held, does not vitiate the result of the trial, State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 886. 81. Defective investigation.—Order for investigation passed under second proviso to Section 17 contained in a typed proforma, held, not by itself indicative of non-application of mind or having been passed in a mechanical and casual manner, State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 886. 82. Validity of investigation.—Where Superintendent of CBI issued order authorising an Inspector of CBI to investigate offences under Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(e) (prior to substitution) against respondent, held, investigation conducted by the Inspector valid. It is not necessary in such case that an officer of the rank of Dy. Supdt. Of Police should conduct the investigation. Hence investigation was not liable to be quashed under

655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. 68. Trial.—Bribe-giver, who was a private person, held, can be tried along with public servant, State of U.P. v. Udai Narayan, (1999) 8 SCC 741; Udai Narayan v. State of U.P., 1999 SCC OnLine All 48. 69. Value of assets.—In absence of positive grounds for doing otherwise, the value of a particular asset determined in the earlier proceedings, held, could not be enhanced in the subsequent proceedings, M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1999) 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 397. 70. Charge against Forester of asking complainant Forest Guard to collect mamools (bribe money) and pay the same to him as a motive or reward for allowing the farmers/ryots to graze their cattle in the forest area—No attempt made by prosecution to secure any witness among ryots from the village to prove the factum of collection of the alleged mamools—In absence of any acceptable evidence about demand of bribe, held, charge not proved—In such circumstances the explanation offered by the appellant cannot be simply thrown away as unworthy of acceptance, S.V. Kameswar Rao v. State, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 377 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 694. 71. Trap case.—Veracity of prosecution story should be tested having regard to normal human behaviour and preponderance of probabilities, Tej Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 1990 Supp SCC 125 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 627. 72. Quantum of sentence.—Special reasons for sentence of less than one year's imprisonment, explained, D. Srinivasan v. Delhi Special Police Establishment, 1993 SCC (Cri) 792. 73. Mitigating circumstances, determined, Ajit Kumar Vasantlal Zaveri v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 482 : 1993 SCC (Cri)

(Cri) 152; S. Bangarappa v. State by CBI, (2000) 3 Kant LJ 432, reversed. 83. Persons authorized to investigate.—Investigation by police officers of Inspector rank is only an irregularity. Unless such irregularity resulted in causing prejudice, conviction will not be vitiated and bad in law, Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88. 84. Defect or irregularity in investigation.—Defect or irregularity in investigation however serious, would have no direct bearing on competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Where cognizance of case has already been taken and case has proceeded to termination, invalidity of precedent investigation does not vitiate result, unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby, Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88. 85. Applicability.—Section 19 applies to High Courts, Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607; ITO v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 : (1969) 2 SCR 65, distinguished. 86. Interpretation/Construction.—Expression “any other ground” in Section 19(3)(c), refers to and relates to all grounds that are available in proceedings under the Act other than grounds which relate to sanction granted by the authority. No warrant to add words not found in Section 19(3)(c), namely, that these grounds should be relatable to sanction only, Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 299. 87. Nature and scope.—Section 19 mandates that no court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under the provisions specified therein except with the previous sanction by the authorities specified therein. Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance. But, even if a cognizance of the offence is taken erroneously and the same comes to the court's notice at a later stage a finding to that effect is permissible. Even such a plea can be taken for the first time before an appellate court, State of Karanataka v. C. Nagarajaswamy, (2005) 8 SCC 370. 88. Sanction for prosecution.— IRS officer cadre controlling authority is Finance Minister of India and as such sanction granted by him was valid sanction. Further held, fact that in administrative notings different authorities like CVC, DoPT had opined differently, is inconsequential since business of State being complicated, it has necessary to be conducted through agency of large number of officials and authorities, Vivek Batra v. Union of India, (2017) 1 SCC 69 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 84 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 219. 89. A public servant who committed an offence mentioned in the Act, while he was a public servant, can be prosecuted with the sanction contemplated in Section 19 of the Act if he continues to be a public servant when the court takes cognizance of the offence. But if he ceases to be a public servant by that time, the court can take cognizance of the offence without any such sanction, Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1998) 6 SCC 411 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455. 90. Under Section 19 (prior to substitution) of the Act, no court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the person concerned. In this case the Secretary (Vigilance) was authorised to grant sanction only on 23-4-1994. The sanction accorded by the said authority prior to the said date, held, was without jurisdiction. Hence, proceedings quashed due to non-compliance with Section 19, P.A. Mohandas v. State of Kerala, (2003) 9 SCC 504. 91. Sanction for prosecution of Judge of Supreme Court or High Court—Not ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale required after he ceases to hold the office even if the offence relates to the period when he was holding the office—(Per Verma, J.), the Judge being a constitutional functionary to whom Section 6 itself is inapplicable, sanction for his prosecution is not required simply because Section 6 is not attracted. President as the authority competent to remove Judges of Supreme Court and High Courts and hence sanctioning authority under— Held, (per Ray, Shetty and Venkatachaliah, JJ.) so that it may not result in interference of Executive with Judiciary, criminal case against the Judge must be registered and decision regarding grant of sanction for prosecution of the Judges must be taken by the President in consultation and in accordance with advice rendered by CJI and the decision regarding grant of sanction for prosecution of the CJI himself, must be taken by the President in consultation with the other Judges of the Supreme Court, K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. 92. Sanction for prosecution of Ministers after resignation for offences committed during tenure as Ministers, held, not required, M.P. Special

of Orissa, (1998) 6 SCC 411; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172; S.A. Venkataraman v. State, 1958 SCR 1040; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. 93. Grant of sanction for prosecution by Governor against aid and advice of Council of Ministers, reiterated, following M.P. Special Police Establishment, (2004) 8 SCC 788, is permissible. This is one of the cases where Governor could act despite the advice of the Council of Ministers, on the ground of propriety, Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1. 94. On date of taking cognizance of alleged offence, office which accused held, is relevant for determining necessity of sanction. If on that date he ceased to hold the office which he had held as public servant at time of commission of alleged offence, sanction is not required to be obtained for his prosecution even if he thereafter continued to be a public servant in a different capacity/office, L. Narayana

of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349; State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair, (2001) 4 SCC 752; Habibulla Khan v. State of Orissa, (1995) 2 SCC 437; Kalicharan

of Karnataka, (2016) 9 SCC 598 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 837 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 696. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 95. Bar against double conviction.—Article 20 of the Constitution or Section 300 CrPC bar against double conviction for same offence, cannot operate as a bar for a second or even third proper sanction if trial was vitiated due to absence of valid sanction by competent authority. If trial was vitiated due to absence of valid sanction, court trying it will lack jurisdiction for such trial and entire trial proceedings would be invalid and non est in law. If entire trial is no est in law, there can be no bar to fresh trial and conviction after obtaining proper sanction under Section 19(1) of PC Act, 1988, Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 360. 96. Power to give sanction.—It is not necessary that the authority competent to give sanction for prosecution or the authority competent to remove the public servant should be vertically superior in the hierarchy in which the office of the public servant exists. There is no such requirement under Section 6. The power to give sanction for prosecution can be conferred on any authority. Such authority may be of the department in which the public servant is working or an outside authority. All that is required is that the authority must be in a position to appreciate the material collected against the public servant to judge whether the prosecution contemplated is frivolous or speculative. The observations to the contrary made in Antulay case were not intended to lay down the law. Judgements are not to be read as statutes. Discretion to prosecute or not to prosecute a public servant—Taken away from prosecuting agency and conferred on sanctioning authority—Sanctioning authority has to apply its mind to material on record and form its own opinion—But if material makes out the offence, authority is bound to accord the sanction, K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734. 97. Burden of proof.—The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the sanction is valid. Such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based. These facts might appear on the face of the sanction or it might be proved by independent evidence that sanction was accorded for prosecution after those facts had been placed before the sanctioning authority. The fact that the sanctioning authority signed the sanction for the prosecution on the file and not the formal sanction produced in the court makes no material difference, State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, (1974) 3 SCC 72, 80 : (1974) 1 SCR 146 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 774. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 98. Cognizance of offence.—If sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 1988, or Section 197 of the CrPC is viewed, no Court of a Special Judge under the former Act and Magistrate under the latter, can take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties mentioned therein except with the previous sanction of the appropriate authority, Vinod Lal v. State of H.P., 1994 SCC OnLine HP 51. 99. Court takes cognizance of an offence and not an offender, State of W.B. v. Manmal Bhutoria, (1977) 3 SCC 440 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 520. 100. Parallel investigation.—The accused was alleged to have demanded some money for getting the electricity connection in the name of the petitioner. In connection with the said matter, the competent authority holding a parallel investigation to judge the truth of the allegations made against the accused by calling for the record/report of his Department. Held, refusal to grant sanction by taking into account ground which the Authority had no right to consider is not proper, Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1996 SCC OnLine P&H 85. 101. Validity of sanction.—Appellant initially appointed as Special Auditor by the Commissioner. Subsequently appellant absorbed in Local Fund Accounts Department and was working under the control of the Chief Auditor. Held, Chief Auditor is competent authority to remove the appellant from the service and, therefore, sanction accorded by him is valid, M.W. Mohiuddin v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 3 SCC 567 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 546. 102. Sanction implies application of mind, Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1784. 103. Non-application of mind and grant of sanction mechanically by sanctioning authority—Basis of acquittal by High Court—High Court deeply influenced in its decision by the fact that a model sanction order was enclosed with the record sent to the sanctioning authority—Held, acquittal not justified—There was no infirmity in the order granting sanction, State of T.N. v. Damodaran, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 221 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 272. 104. Sanction—Non-application of mind in granting sanction alleged— High Court finding on material that the sanctioning authority had applied his mind to the materials—Held, no interference called for and hence sanction valid, Balaram Swami v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 510 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 707. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale 105. Infirmity in the sanction would invalidate the prosecution case, Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1974) 4 SCC 560 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 596. 106. The policy underlying Section 6 and similar sections, is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servants. The object is to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. Existence thus of a valid sanction is a prerequisite to the taking of cognizance of the offences. In absence of such sanction the Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences. A trial without a valid sanction where one is necessary under Section 6 is a trial without jurisdiction by the court, R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172. 107. The order of sanction under Section 18 must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it, Anti-Corruption Branch v. R.C. Anand (Dr), (2004) 4 SCC 615 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1380. 108. “Failure of justice”.—Merely because objection regarding sanction was raised at the earlier stage of the proceedings, it cannot be a ground for holding that there was a failure of justice to justify a stay. Even if such objection was overruled by Special Judge, though later on upheld by High Court, that would not amount to failure of justice. Section 19(3)(c), held, per curiam, bars grant of stay of proceedings by use of any power by any court or any ground and even by High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr P.C., Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607. 109. In this case neither the trial court nor the High Court appear to have kept in view the requirements of sub-s. 3 relating to question regarding “failure of justice”. Merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court records the satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice. The same logic also applies to appellate or revisional court. The requirements of sub-section (4) about raising the issue at the earliest stage has not been also considered. Unfortunately, the High Court by a practically non- reasoned order, confirmed the order passed by the learned trial judge. The orders are, therefore, indefensible, State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy, (2004) 7 SCC 763. 110. “Alteration of conviction”.—In view of Sections 19(3)(a) and 27 ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale of the 1988 Act, held, the conviction could not be altered or reversed by the appellate court on the ground of even absence of sanction much less on the ground of incompetent sanction, Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal, (1999) 8 SCC 501 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1494. 111. Application of mind by sanctioning authority.—Competent authority is answerable to law and law alone. Decision must therefore be taken without being influenced by extraneous considerations (like political fallout). Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution, must be strictly adhered to. Article 14 of the Constitution must be construed as a guarantee against uncanalised and arbitrary power. The absence of any time-limit in granting sanction in Section 19 of the PC Act is not in consonance with the requirement of the due process of law which has been read into the Constitution of India, by the Constitution Bench decision in Maneka Gandhi case, (1978) 1 SCC 248. Section 19(1) being a special provision prevails over general provision relating to cognizance of offence under Section 190 CrPC. There is no restriction on a private citizen filing a private complaint against a public servant. Court is also not barred from taking cognizance of offence by relying on incriminating material collected by private citizen. Locus standi of a private citizen is therefore not excluded. Private citizen's right to file complaint against public servant, and to obtain sanction for prosecuting public servant flows from rule of law. Decision to grant or to refuse sanction is not a quasi-judicial function but an administrative function. Opportunity of hearing is therefore not required to be given to affected person. Sanctioning authority to apply mind whether material collected against a public servant is prima facie sufficient to proceed against him for offence alleged. If so, sanction ought to be given. Sanctioning authority not to undertake detailed enquiry whether allegations are true, Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041. 112. Deemed sanction.—When Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta, if after investigation, is satisfied that public servant has committed any criminal offence, prosecution can be initiated for which prior sanction of any authority required under any law for such prosecution shall also be deemed to have been granted, Chandrashekaraiah v. Janekere C. Krishna, (2013) 3 SCC 117 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 826 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 347. 113. Absence of sanction.—Sanction under Section 19(1) is a ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale precondition for ordering investigation against public servant under Section 156(3) CrPC even at pre-cognizance stage. Non-effect of absence of sanction in some circumstances under Section 19(3) does not mean that requirement of sanction is not mandatory, Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705. 114. Subsequent filing of fresh charge-sheet.—In case of discharge of accused before commencement of trial due to invalid/improper sanction for prosecution (i.e. sanction by incompetent authority), subsequent filing of a fresh/supplementary charge-sheet after obtaining a valid/proper sanction, is permissible and not barred by principles of “double jeopardy”, State of Mizoram v. C. Sangnghina, (2019) 13 SCC 335. 115. Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.—What law requires is application of mind by sanctioning authority on material placed before it to satisfy itself of prima facie case that would constitute offence. Mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) is matter of procedure and does not go to root of jurisdiction and once cognizance has been taken by court under CrPC, it cannot be said that invalid police report is foundation of jurisdiction of court to take cognizance and for that matter trial, Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88. 116. Non-entitlement to protection.—Protection under Section 19 of PC Act is available to a public servant only till he is in employment and no sanction thereunder is necessary after the public servant has demitted office or has retired from service. As regards sanction under Section 197 CrPC, for an action to come within purview of Section 197 CrPC, it must be integrally connected with official duties or functions of public servant concerned, and if the office was merely used as a cloak to indulge in activities which result in unlawful gain to the beneficiaries, the protection under said Section 197 CrPC would not be available, CBI v. B.A. Srinivasan, (2020) 2 SCC 153. 117. Sanction for prosecution.—Though opinion of CVC is only advisory, it is nevertheless a valuable input in the decision-making process of the appointing authority. However, the final decision of the appointing authority must be of its own, by application of independent mind, Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI, (2023) 1 SCC 329. 118. Review of earlier decision in Absence of Fresh Material.—Fresh order reviewing sanction and granting the same may be permitted only ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale when such review and conclusion are based on fresh materials available, CBI v. R. Bhuvaneswari, (2024) 1 HCC (Bom) 32. 119. Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or under Section 11, it is proved that a public servant accused of an offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain that undue advantage, as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly either by himself or by another public servant or, as the case may be, any undue advantage without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate under Section 11.] 120. Applicability.—Where demand is not proved, Section 20 will have no application, Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 493. 121. Interpreation/Construction.—Section 20(1) (prior to substitution) of the Act in essence and substance is same as Section 4(1) of the previous Act of 1947. The expression “shall be presumed” employed in this section read with the definition of “shall presume” in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872 shows it must have the same import of compulsion, that is to say that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc. if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing legal presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. But the section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied only by direct evidence. It can be proved by other modes envisaged in the Evidence Act, T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753. 122. Burden of proof.—Initial burden of proof is illegal gratification and misconduct prosecution and once there is a presumption as contemplated under Section 20, it is for the accused to establish that the amount was not received as bribe, Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462. 123. Presumption.—Presumption under Section 20(1) (prior to substitution), held, is a legal or compulsory presumption, M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 258; State of ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale A.P. v. C. Uma Maheswara Rao, (2004) 4 SCC 399; State of A.P. v. V. Vasudeva Rao, (2004) 9 SCC 319 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 968; T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 870. 124. Presumption under Section 20(1) (prior to substitution), held, can be proved even by factual presumption and not necessarily by direct evidence, M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 258; T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753. 125. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts, State of A.P. v. C. Uma Maheswara Rao, (2004) 4 SCC 399. 126. Statutory presumption under Section 20 is available for the offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 or Section 13(1)(a) or (b) and not for clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 (prior to substitution), Subhash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 5 SCC 86 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 954. 127. Where receipt of gratification was proved, held, the court was under a legal obligation to presume that such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing the public duty, M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 258. 128. When money was recovered from the pocket of one of the accused persons, a presumption under Section 20 of the Act is obligatory. It is a presumption of law and casts an obligation on the court to operate it in every case brought in Section 7. The presumption is a rebuttable presumption and it is by proof and not by an explanation which may seem to be plausible, T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753; State of A.P. v. V. Vasudeva Rao, (2004) 9 SCC 319; A. Abdul Kaffar v. State of Kerala, (2004) 9 SCC 333, followed Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) 2 SCC 227 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 499; Surajmal v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 4 SCC 725 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 159, distinguished; V.K.

(Delhi Admn.), (1975) 1 SCC 784 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 277, impliedly distinguished. 129. Rebutted of presumption.—Accused can rebut charge either through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by adducing reliable evidence. Burden of proof on accused under Section 20 is not the same as the burden placed on prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt, C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779. 130. Rebuttal of statutory presumption.—Statutory presumption ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale can be rebutted by bringing on record some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that money was accepted other than for motive or reward under Section 7. Standard required for rebutting presumption is tested on anvil of preponderance of probabilities which is threshold of lower degree than proof beyond all reasonable doubt, Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88. 131. Reasonable doubt.—While invoking provisions of Section 20 court is required to consider explanation offered by accused, if any, only on touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, Mukut

of Rajasthan, (2012) 11 SCC 642. 132. Keeping in view that the demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification is a condition precedent for constituting an offence under PC Act, it is to be noted that there is a statutory presumption under Section 20, PC Act which can be dislodged by the accused by bringing on record some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that money was accepted other than for the motive or the reward as stipulated under Section 7, PC Act. When some explanation is offered, the court is obliged to consider the explanation under Section 20 and the consideration of the explanation has to be on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. It is not to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt, K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 721 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 791 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 257. 133. Applicability.—The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to trials under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 subject to certain modifications as contained in Section 22 of the Act and their exclusion either express or by necessary implication. Section 223 Cr PC has not been excluded either expressly or by necessary implication nor has the same been modified in their application to trials under the Act. The said provision therefore is applicable to the trial of an offence punishable under the Act, Vivek Gupta v. CBI, (2003) 8 SCC 628. 134. Appointment — Special Judges.—Section 26 protects the appointment of those Special Judges who were earlier appointed under Section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. In re: H.D. ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale Barman v. CBI/SPE/Calcutta through State of W.B., 1993 SCC OnLine Cal 215. 135. Special Judge — not subordinate.—In view of the provisions of Section 27 of the PC Act of 1988, Special Judge is not subordinate to the Sessions Judge, Ravi Nandan Sahay, Sessions Judge, Patna, 1993 Cri LJ 2436 (FB). 136. Corrections of date.—Where appellant-accused contended for the first time before the High Court that the date written on the complaint made to CBI was different from that claimed by the prosecution, since there was a question of fact, High Court could not have made out a new case regarding correctness of the date. Mere suggestions made before the trial court that the document was not prepared at the time alleged, held, could not sustain the said plea as there is a lot of difference between “time” and “date”, State of A.P. v. C. Uma Maheswara Rao, (2004) 4 SCC 399. 137. Applicability.—Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act does not substitute its Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2) is applicable “without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639. 138. Effect of the Act.—Section 30(2) introduces a legal fiction to the effect that the Act had come into force when anything was done or action was taken under or in pursuance of the Act of 1947, Nar Bahadur Bhandari v. State of Sikkim, (1998) 5 SCC 39 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1252. 139. The consistency, referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30 is with respect to acts done in pursuance of the repealed Act and thus restricted it to such provision of the Acts which come for interpretation of the court and not the whole of the scheme of the enactment. There is no inconsistency between Section 5-A of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Act and provisions of the General Clauses Act would be applicable and with the aid of sub-section (2) of Section 30 anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken in pursuance of the 1947 Act be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of the 1988 Act. For that have been in force at the time when the impugned notifications were issued under the then prevalent corresponding law. Otherwise also there ### For Internal Circulation Only ### Not for Sale does not appear any inconsistency between the two enactments except that the scope and field covered by the 1988 Act has been widened and enlarged. Both the enactments deal with the same subject matter i.e. corruption amongst the public servants and make provision to deal with such a menace. Hence there was no substance in the argument that the provision made in the two enactments were inconsistent and sub-section (2) of Section 30 would not save the notifications issued under the 1947

(Cri) 659; Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 SCC OnLine P&H 1172, reversed.

at which an accused can raise questions about the validity of the sanction. The court emphasised that such issues should ideally be raised as early as possible— either during cognisance, at the time of framing charges, or during the final arguments. It was observed that an invalid sanction could render the trial proceedings void, with the trial court empowered to discharge the accused. This also mandates fresh sanctioning by the competent authority. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that findings by the Special Judge could not be overturned by the High Court unless failure of justice is proven, as stipulated under Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act. ### A. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Rakesh Sharma, (2023) 8 SCC 711 This case highlighted the jurisdiction of special courts under the PC Act to proceed with charges under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) independently. The court clarified that the absence of sanction for PC Act offences does not preclude the court from pursuing IPC-related offences. This decision strengthens the procedural independence of special courts, ensuring that technicalities do not hinder justice. ### Soundarajan v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 424 The Supreme Court reiterated that proving a demand for gratification is integral under Section 7 of the PC Act. It emphasised that mere solicitation for money is insufficient; it must be for ‘gratification,’ as defined in the statute. The court explained that if the demand for gratification and its acceptance are proven, a presumption under Section 20 can be invoked. This presumption, however, remains rebuttable, allowing the accused to present evidence disproving the charges. ### P. Sarangapani (Dead) v. State of A.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1200 The court addressed the statutory presumption against public servants who accept undue advantages. Once acceptance of gratification beyond legal remuneration is established, courts can presume corrupt motives under Section 7 of the PC Act. However, the accused retains the right to rebut this presumption. This case reaffirmed the robust framework against corruption while maintaining safeguards for the accused. ### State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh, (2023) 6 SCC 559 In this case, the Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against quashing First Information Reports (FIRs) in corruption cases during the investigation stage. The court noted that premature quashing could obstruct uncovering evidence regarding the disproportionate assets of public servants. It stressed that only after investigations can a comprehensive understanding of the charges emerge, necessitating judicial restraint. ### Jitendra Kumar Rode v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 485 The court underscored the appellant’s right to challenge trial court findings during appeals, as per Section 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). It mandated that the lower court records be made available to appellate courts to ensure a fair and informed decision-making process. ### State through C.B.I. v. T. Gangi Reddy, (2023) 4 SCC 253 This judgement discussed the provisions of default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC. The court ruled that default bail granted due to procedural delays could be canceled based on the merits of the case post-charge sheet filing, rather than being automatically nullified upon filing. ### State through C.B.I. v. Hemendhra Reddy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 515 The court examined Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, which deals with public servants possessing disproportionate assets. The ruling highlighted the safeguard requiring approval from a superior officer before initiating investigations under this provision. This ensures that investigations are conducted with due diligence and accountability. ### Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 320 In this case, the court reiterated the necessity of proving both demand and recovery for a conviction under the PC Act. The conviction of the accused was overturned due to the prosecution’s failure to establish evidence of demand, emphasising the stringent evidentiary standards required. ### Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 This case clarified that circumstantial or documentary evidence can substantiate the demand for illegal gratification, even in the absence of direct evidence from the complainant. However, the court maintained that proving demand is an indispensable component under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i), and (ii) of the PC Act. The judgement reaffirmed that acceptance of money alone, without evidence of demand, does not constitute a valid charge. ### CBI v. Vikas Mishra, (2023) 6 SCC 49

case clarified that the period of police custody does not automatically lapse if the police are unable to fully utilise the granted remand period due to exigent circumstances. The ruling ensures that law enforcement agencies can effectively interrogate the accused within the permissible period without being hindered by unforeseen disruptions. This decision underscores the flexibility of police custody provisions and balances the needs of investigation with the rights of the accused. ### Mahdoom Bava v. CBI, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 299 The court questioned the prevalent practice of courts remanding accused individuals to custody immediately upon their appearance in response to a summons. The judgement established that appellants who voluntarily appear after receiving a summoning order are entitled to bail, subject to reasonable conditions set by the Special Court. This decision protects the rights of individuals who comply with legal procedures while ensuring that necessary conditions, such as surrendering passports, are imposed to prevent misuse. ### State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768 This case provided clarity on the term “known sources of income” under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act, 1988. It elaborated on the stage at which the burden shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for disproportionate assets. The ruling reinforces that the prosecution must first establish prima facie evidence of disproportionate assets before the burden shifts to the accused to explain their sources of income. ### CBI v. R.R. Kishore, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1146 In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed that its previous decision in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, which struck down Section 6A of the DSPE Act, 1946, will have retrospective effect. This means that public officials no longer have immunity from prosecution for offences committed before the provision was declared unconstitutional. The ruling enhances accountability and ensures that corrupt public officials cannot escape liability based on procedural safeguards that no longer hold legal validity. ### State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360 The judgement interpreted the definition of “public duty” under Section 2(b) of the PC Act, stating that any duty performed where the State, public, or community at large has an interest constitutes a public duty. This broad interpretation ensures that a wide range of officials and their activities fall under the purview of the Act, reinforcing public accountability and strengthening anti- corruption measures. ### Vinod Kumar Garg v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 88 The court addressed the procedural aspect of investigation, ruling that failure to conduct an investigation by an officer of the requisite rank under Section 17 of the PC Act is an irregularity but does not automatically vitiate the conviction unless it results in prejudice to the accused. This decision strikes a balance between procedural compliance and substantive justice, ensuring that technical lapses do not overshadow material evidence leading to a conviction. ### Yashwant Sinha and Ors. v. CBI and Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 338 In this case, the Supreme Court examined Section 17A of the PC Act, which requires prior approval from a competent authority before initiating an inquiry or investigation against a public servant for actions related to official functions. The ruling emphasised that no investigation can proceed without such prior approval, reinforcing procedural safeguards to protect honest public servants from frivolous investigations while maintaining a legal framework to address genuine corruption cases. ### Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 This landmark case interpreted Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, particularly focusing on sub-clauses (b) and (c). The Supreme Court held that Section 19(3)(b) encompasses all grounds related to sanction errors, omissions, or irregularities. It emphasised that proceedings under the Act can only be stayed if there is a failure of justice arising from an issue with the sanction. The court further clarified that corruption trials should be expedited and not subjected to unnecessary delays, as prolonged trials allow corrupt officials to remain in office, thereby harming public trust and governance. ### Rajiv Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 8 SCC 791 In this case, the court analysed Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (before its amendment) and affirmed that its three sub-clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) are independent and disjunctive. This means that proving any one of the sub-clauses is sufficient to establish an offence of criminal misconduct. The ruling reinforces the expansive scope of the provision, ensuring that various forms of corrupt behavior are covered within the statutory framework. ### Vasant Rao Guhe v. State of M.P., (2017) 14 SCC 442 This case dealt with the burden of proof in cases involving disproportionate assets. The Supreme Court ruled that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a public servant possessed assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. The accused is not required to furnish an explanation unless the prosecution first establishes a prima facie case. The ruling underscores the importance of evidence-based prosecution and prevents undue harassment of public officials without substantial proof. ### C.B.I. v. Ramesh Gelli, (2016) 3 SCC 788 The Supreme Court expanded the definition of ‘public servant’ under the Prevention of Corruption Act by including managing directors and chairpersons of private banks. The court harmonised the objectives of the Act with Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, reasoning that private banking officials discharge functions that impact public interest. This ruling widens the ambit of the anti-corruption law, ensuring that private sector officials in critical positions are held accountable for corrupt practices. ### N. Sunkanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2016) 1 SCC 713 This case reaffirmed that demand for illegal gratification is an essential element to establish an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court ruled that mere possession and recovery of money from an accused is insufficient to convict unless there is proof of demand. Furthermore, the ruling clarified that the presumption under Section 20 can only be applied when there is conclusive proof of acceptance following a demand. This judgement establishes clear evidentiary requirements, ensuring that convictions are not based on presumptions alone. ### Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Ors., (2015) 3 ### SCC 123 In this case, the Supreme Court held that sanction for prosecution under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, should not be granted if the prosecution is vexatious or lacks substantive merit. Furthermore, the court emphasised that judicial authorities cannot issue a directive to the sanctioning authority to grant prosecution approval. This ruling reinforces the discretionary power of the sanctioning authority, ensuring that it independently evaluates the evidence before proceeding with prosecution. ### Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230 The court ruled that mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient to convict an accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The prosecution must present solid evidence of demand and acceptance of a bribe. The ruling emphasised that the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by other material evidence, and the accused should be presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This judgement underscores the importance of stringent proof standards in bribery cases. ### P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra ### Pradesh, (2015) 10 SCC 152 This judgement reinforced the principle that proof of demand is an essential requirement for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Supreme Court clarified that mere possession or recovery of bribe money, without evidence of demand, does not constitute an offence. The prosecution must establish demand and acceptance beyond doubt to secure a conviction, emphasising the significance of direct and circumstantial evidence in corruption cases. ### CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295 The court laid down important guidelines regarding the role of the prosecution and the sanctioning authority in granting prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the Act. The guidelines included: • The prosecution must present all relevant records, including FIR, witness statements, and evidence that may favor the accused. • The sanctioning authority must independently examine all evidence before granting or denying sanction. • The sanction should reflect conscious scrutiny of all presented materials to ensure a fair and just decision. This judgement strengthens procedural safeguards in corruption cases and ensures that sanctioning decisions are well-informed and legally sound. ### Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420 The Supreme Court clarified that while municipal board members or councillors may not fall under the definition of “public servant” under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, they can still be considered public servants under specific enactments such as the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. Additionally, the judgement stated that the power to grant sanction cannot be delegated and must be exercised by the competent authority after independently assessing the facts. This ruling highlights the importance of identifying public servants within the correct legal framework. ### B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 The court reaffirmed that demand of illegal gratification is the core component of an offence under Section 7 of the Act. The ruling stated that mere recovery of money does not amount to a conviction unless it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly accepted it as a bribe. Furthermore, the judgement clarified that the presumption under Section 20 applies only when demand and acceptance are proven beyond doubt, preventing wrongful convictions based on recovery alone. ### Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 This landmark case declared Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, unconstitutional. The court held that differentiating between officials based on their rank for prosecution violates Article 14 of the Constitution, as it impedes the investigation of corruption allegations. The ruling ensures that all public officials, regardless of rank, are subject to equal scrutiny under anti-corruption laws, reinforcing accountability and transparency. ### State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain, (2013) 8 SCC 119 The Supreme Court ruled that granting sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is an administrative function and does not require a detailed judicial inquiry. The sanctioning authority is only required to form a prima facie opinion based on available evidence. This ruling underscores the fact that the process of granting sanction should not be unduly delayed or complicated. ### Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a Special Judge cannot order the registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority under Section 19(1) of the Act. This judgement highlights the necessity of securing prior sanction before initiating an investigation against a public servant, reinforcing the procedural safeguards in corruption cases. ### Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 The Supreme Court issued guidelines to ensure timely processing of sanction requests for prosecuting public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The key guidelines include: • A maximum period of three months to decide sanction requests. • An additional one-month extension in case consultation with legal officers (Attorney General, Solicitor General, or Advocate General) is required. • If no decision is made within the prescribed period, sanction will be deemed granted, and the prosecuting agency can file the charge sheet. These guidelines aim to prevent unnecessary delays in corruption cases and ensure accountability of public servants. ### State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92 The court held that the power of the State to grant or refuse sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act is administrative in nature and can be reviewed at a later stage. The decision also emphasised that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to all relevant material before granting or refusing sanction. The court further clarified that superior courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority to grant or deny sanction but can review the decision to ensure proper application of mind. ### C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 The judgement clarified the nature of the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Supreme Court stated that the presumption of guilt against an accused public servant is rebuttable and not absolute. The accused can rebut this presumption through cross-examination of witnesses or by producing credible evidence. Additionally, the burden of proof on the accused is lighter than the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ### Parkash Singh Badal and Another v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 1 This case expanded the scope of Sections 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, stating that gratification received for inducing another public servant to perform or refrain from performing an official act falls under the Act’s purview. The court clarified that gratification is not limited to pecuniary benefits and includes any form of inducement or reward. The judgement emphasised that the legislative intent behind Sections 8 and 9 is broad and should not be restricted to private individuals alone. ### Romesh Lal Jain v. Naginder Singh Rana & Ors., (2006) 1 SCC 294 The Supreme Court held that an order granting or refusing sanction must be preceded by an independent application of mind by the appropriate authority. The ruling provided a test to determine whether a sanction order can be considered composite in nature—there must be a direct and proximate connection between the Prevention of Corruption Act and the offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The test involves evaluating whether the IPC offences are essential to prove the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. ### Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, (2005) 10 SCC 471 In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that a departmental inquiry and a criminal trial can proceed simultaneously against a public servant accused of offences under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, an exception was carved out where conducting both proceedings concurrently would cause serious prejudice to the accused in their criminal defence. The court emphasised that no rigid rule applies in such situations, and each case should be assessed on its unique facts. ### M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of M.P. & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 788 The court clarified that a minister does not require prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for prosecution after their resignation for offences committed during their tenure. This ruling ensures that public officials cannot evade accountability by resigning from their positions and underscores the principle that public office does not provide immunity from prosecution after demitting office. ### Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Subhas Sharma, (2002) 4 SCC 145 The Supreme Court held that officials of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan are covered under the definition of “public servant” under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Since the institution is fully funded by the Central Government, its employees fall within the purview of the Act, thereby subjecting them to anti- corruption laws and ensuring accountability in government-funded institutions. ### Subash Parbat Sonvane v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 5 SCC 86 In this case, the court analysed the elements of Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It emphasised that to establish guilt under this provision, the prosecution must prove that the accused obtained a financial advantage for themselves or others through dishonest means or abuse of their position. The judgement highlighted the legislative distinction between “accepting” and “obtaining” gratification, with the latter placing a higher burden of proof on the prosecution. ### State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Rao & Anr., (2002) 7 SCC 636 The court held that the definition of “public servant” under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) does not apply to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This ruling clarified that the PC Act has an independent definition of public servants that applies specifically to corruption-related cases. ### M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 The Supreme Court ruled that when the receipt of gratification by a public servant is proven, courts are legally bound to presume that the gratification was accepted as a reward for performing a public duty. This presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is rebuttable, meaning the accused can challenge it by providing contrary evidence.

This judgement reiterated the fundamental objective of the Prevention of Corruption Act—to curb bribery and corruption among public servants. The court stated that the Act is a social legislation aimed at maintaining public trust in government institutions and should be interpreted liberally to fulfil its purpose rather than in favor of the accused. ### P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626 In this landmark ruling, the Supreme Court held that Members of Parliament (MPs) are considered public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It further clarified that, until legislative amendments are made, prosecution of MPs requires permission from the Presiding Officer of the respective legislative body. This ruling reinforced accountability within legislative institutions and prevented MPs from evading legal scrutiny. (Now Overruled By Sita Soren’s Judgment) ### Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 226 This case led to significant reforms in India’s anti-corruption framework. The Supreme Court issued several directives aimed at strengthening the autonomy of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and ensuring its independence from political influence. The court directed: • Statutory recognition of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). • Empowering the CVC with oversight functions over the CBI. • Establishment of fixed tenure for the Director of the CBI to ensure stability and prevent undue influence. • Nullification of the “Single Directive,” which previously shielded senior bureaucrats from investigation without prior approval. These directives significantly enhanced institutional mechanisms to tackle corruption effectively.

Jharkhand 6 Jan Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act CrPC For accused added under Section 319 CrPC, bail decision must rest on strong, cogent evidence—not mere prima facie satisfaction for framing charge. 5 Sumit Bansal v. M/s MGI Developers & Promoters 8 Jan Supreme Court NI Act Each dishonoured cheque creates separate cause of action under Section 138 NI Act, even if arising from same transaction. 6 UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. 11 Jan Supreme Court Promoter’s undertaking to arrange/infuse funds ≠ contract of guarantee under Section 126 unless clear promise to discharge borrower’s debt on default. 7 Kishorilal (D) thr. LRs & Ors. v. Gopal & Ors. 11 Jan Supreme Court Indian Contract Act 12 Jan Supreme Court CPC In specific performance suits, original vendor is a necessary party despite subsequent property transfer during litigation. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 8 Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors. SRA Doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 TPA binds transferee pendente lite; cannot resist decree execution by invoking bona fide purchaser protection under Section 19(b) SRA. 9 Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma 13 Jan Supreme Court HAMA Widow daughter-in-law remains “dependant” under Sections 21(vii), 22 HAMA, entitled to claim maintenance from father-in-law’s estate. 10 Sanjay Paliwal &

Authority of India 6 Jan Supreme Court Unilateral appointment of arbitrator by ineligible person under Section 12(5) is void ab initio; participation cannot cure ineligibility. 4 Md Imran @ D.C.

Heavy Electricals Ltd. 13 Jan Supreme Court SRA Suit for mandatory injunction simpliciter not maintainable where title/possession disputed; plaintiff must seek declaration of title and possession. 11 Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa &

Karnataka & Ors. 16 Jan Supreme Court IEA Disclosure statements under Section 27 Evidence Act cannot alone sustain conviction unless circumstantial chain is complete and points unerringly to guilt. 12

Kerala & Ors. 17 Jan Supreme Court BNSS Before directing FIR/investigation against a public servant under Section 175(4) BNSS, complainant must file mandatory affidavit (Priyanka Srivastava). Safeguard not dispensed with. 13 Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. 28 Jan Supreme Court 29 Jan Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act “Court” in Section 29A means Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (or High Court with ordinary original civil jurisdiction), not SC/HC merely because they appointed arbitrator under Section 11. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 ### ONE LINER SUPREME COURT CASES ### FEBRUARY S. No. ### Case Title ### Date ### Court ### Subject ### Key Holding 1 C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera Court’s power under Section 29A(5) to extend arbitrator’s mandate can be exercised even after expiry of prescribed period and after a delayed award has been rendered. 2 Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab 3 Feb Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act Family Law Child welfare is paramount in custody disputes, but cannot override unlawful conduct, breach of undertakings, or foreign custody decrees. 3 M/s Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt.

Madhya Pradesh 12 Feb Supreme Court NDPS Act State cannot compel accused to hand over mobile phone if it forces disclosure of self-incriminating data; Article 20(3) overrides bail conditions. 6 Ghanshyam Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar 21 Feb Supreme Court IEA Non-recovery of murder weapon not fatal where reliable eyewitness testimony and medical evidence consistently establish guilt of accused. 26 Feb Supreme Court ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 ### ONE LINER SUPREME COURT CASES ### MARCH S. No. ### Case Title ### Date ### Court ### Subject ### Key Holding 1 Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel (D) through LRs & Ors. Under Section 133, a surety is discharged only for transactions subsequent to a material variation made without consent, but remains liable for the original liability under the guarantee. 2 Gobind Singh &

India 5 Feb Supreme Court PMLA Special Court cannot order confiscation under Section 8(7) while confirmation of attachment under Section 8(3) is under appellate challenge; confirmation must attain finality first. 4

UP & Anr. 7 Feb Supreme Court CrPC Anticipatory bail cannot ordinarily be restricted till filing of chargesheet; once granted, protection should normally continue unless special reasons justify limitation. 5 Vinay Kumar

India & Ors. 12 Mar Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act 16 Mar Supreme Court Constitution Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) qualifies as “State” under Article 12 due to pervasive governmental control and public welfare functions. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 7 Mohammad

India & Ors. 5 Mar Supreme Court Indian Contract Act CPC No vested right to produce additional evidence at appellate stage; admissible under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC only when statutory conditions are strictly satisfied. 3 Harish Rana v. Union of India 10 Mar Supreme Court Constitution Article 21 includes right to die with dignity; withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment permitted for patients in irreversible vegetative state under passive euthanasia framework (Common Cause v. Union of India). 4

of Rajasthan & Anr. 11 Mar Supreme Court IEA Electronic evidence (e.g., CDRs) inadmissible unless accompanied by mandatory Section 65B certificate; cannot sustain conviction otherwise. 5 Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. M/s R.V. Anderson Associates Ltd. 11 Mar Supreme Court Party that participates in arbitral proceedings without timely objection to tribunal’s constitution/jurisdiction cannot later challenge award on that ground. 6 Ravi Khokhar &

Uttar Pradesh & Ors. CrPC While exercising Section 319 CrPC, courts must not conduct mini-trial; additional accused may be summoned if cumulative evidence is strong and cogent. 8 Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. 17 Mar Supreme Court BNSS Section 173(3) BNSS safeguards against mechanical FIR registration; vague/speculative allegations require preliminary inquiry, else continuation is abuse of process. 9 Hamsaanandini

of India 18 Mar Supreme Court Section 5(4) restricting paid leave to adoption of infants under 3 months unconstitutional; all adoptive mothers equally entitled under Articles 14 & 21. 10 V. Ganesan v. State 18 Mar Supreme Court Maternity Benefit Act IPC Dishonour of post-dated cheque or breach of profit-sharing promise is civil dispute, not cheating under Section 420 IPC, unless fraudulent intent existed at inception. 11 Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. 19 Mar Supreme Court CrPC Courts under Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 may consider overall circumstances and materials, not just FIR, to quash frivolous/vexatious proceedings. 12 Nagaraj V. Mylandla v. PI Opportunities Fund-I & Ors. 20 Mar Supreme Court Enforcement of foreign arbitral award under Section 48 cannot be refused by reopening issues decided abroad; Indian courts cannot re-examine merits under “public policy” label. 31 Mar Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 ### ONE LINER SUPREME COURT CASES ### APRIL S. No. ### Case Title ### Date ### Court ### Subject ### Key Holding 1 Sivakumar v. State rep. by Inspector of Police IPC Mere use of abusive/vulgar language without sexually explicit or obscene element does not constitute offence under Section 294(b) IPC; common intention under Section 34 IPC cannot be inferred merely from presence at scene. 2 Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 6 Apr Supreme Court CrPC Criminal proceedings against a doctor may be quashed under Section 482 CrPC where medical procedure is supported by expert opinion and no prima facie material shows forgery/manipulation of consent form. 3 Renuka v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 6 Apr Supreme Court NI Act Once statutory ingredients of Section 138 NI Act are prima facie satisfied and cheque issuance is undisputed, presumption under Section 139 NI Act cannot be rebutted at pre-trial stage; enforceable debt is matter for trial. 4 Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh 6 Apr Supreme Court IEA In circumstantial evidence cases, motive and recovery under Section 27 Evidence Act cannot alone sustain conviction unless complete chain of circumstances points exclusively to guilt. 5 Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. &

Seth & Ors. 8 Apr Supreme Court CPC Under Section 100 CPC, High Court can interfere only on substantial question of law, not by re-appreciating factual findings of First Appellate Court. 6 Saroj Pandey v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 9 Apr Supreme Court 9 Apr Supreme Court NI Act Mere signing of Board Resolution or designation as Director insufficient for vicarious liability under Section 141 NI Act without specific averments of responsibility for day-to-day affairs. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 7 M/s Chopra Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon & Ors. CPC Person directly affected by interim order under Article 226 entitled to impleadment under principles of Order I Rule 10 CPC, even if not originally a party. 8 Channappa (D) thr. LRs v. Parvatewwa (D) thr. LRs 9 Apr Supreme Court CPC Plaintiff omitting comprehensive declaration of title/possession in initial suit cannot file subsequent suit for same property; barred by Order II Rule 2 and constructive res judicata under Section 11 CPC. 9 Ram Chandra Choudhary &

of Karnataka & Anr. 13 Apr Supreme Court CrPC At Section 156(3) CrPC (now Section 175 BNSS) stage, court cannot evaluate defence or conduct mini-trial; if complaint discloses cognizable offences, investigation must proceed. 12 Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd. 14 Apr Supreme Court 17 Apr Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act Clause stating disputes “can be settled by arbitration” is not binding arbitration agreement under Sections 7 & 11; indicates possibility, not mandatory reference. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 13 Messer Griesheim GmbH v. Goyal Gases Pvt. Ltd. CPC Foreign judgment unenforceable under Sections 13(b) & 13(d) CPC if defendant denied real/effective opportunity to defend; contrary to natural justice and not on merits. 14 M/s Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani & Ors. 21 Apr Supreme Court CPC Under Order VII Rule 11(b),(c) CPC, plaint cannot be rejected for undervaluation/deficient court fees without giving plaintiff opportunity to cure defects within time fixed by court. 15 Sivaraman Nair & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. 21 Apr Supreme Court IPC Mere knowledge of alleged second marriage, without specific allegations of active participation/common intention, insufficient for liability under Sections 494 & 34 IPC against relatives. 16 Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer & Ors. 24 Apr Supreme Court Under Section 7(3), statements by wife/family in dowry harassment complaint about giving dowry cannot alone be basis to prosecute them under Section 3 for giving dowry. 17 Reliance Eminent Trading & Commercial Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority 16 Apr Supreme Court Dowry Prohibition Act 29 Apr Supreme Court Commercial Courts Act Under Order XIII-A CPC, courts may grant summary judgment in commercial disputes where defendant has no real prospect of defence and no oral evidence is necessary. 18 Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Apr (date not specified) Supreme Court SRA Plaintiff seeking declaration of title/possession based on earlier decree need not separately challenge unproduced/unregistered sale deed alleged by defendant; declaratory decree itself repudiates alleged transaction. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 ### ONE LINER SUPREME COURT CASES MAY S. No. ### Case Title ### Date ### Court ### Subject ### Key Holding 1 Reliance Eminent Trading & Commercial Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority 29 Apr Supreme Court Commercial Courts Act Under Order XIII-A CPC, courts may grant summary judgment in commercial disputes where defendant has no real prospect of defence and no oral evidence is necessary. 2 Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy CPC Under Order XXII CPC, right to sue in medical negligence claim survives against legal representatives of deceased doctor where claim involves survivable pecuniary liability; proceedings do not abate on death. 3 Habban Singh v. Sheruddin 4 May Supreme Court Purchaser’s failure to deposit balance sale consideration within stipulated time renders decree for specific performance inexecutable; contract may stand rescinded under Section 28 SRA even without vendor’s separate application. 4 Manjula & Ors. v. D.A. Srinivas 6 May Supreme Court Specific Relief Act CPC While exercising Order VII Rule 11(a),(d) CPC, courts must examine substance of plaint over clever drafting; plaint disclosing barred benami claim disguised as testamentary dispute liable to rejection at threshold. 5 Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lt. Col. Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt 8 May Supreme Court Wife’s decision to live separately for child’s healthcare and professional career does not constitute cruelty or desertion; marriage cannot extinguish autonomy, dignity, and economic independence under Article 21. 6 Hirani Developers v. Nehru Nagar Samruddhi CHS Ltd. 12 May Supreme Court Hindu Marriage Act 13 May Supreme Court Arbitration & Conciliation Act Under Section 7(5), arbitration clause in earlier agreement validly incorporated into subsequent agreement where later adopts earlier “body and soul.” ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 7 Talari Naresh v. State of Telangana IPC Evidence of hostile witness not discarded in toto; may be relied upon in favour of accused where it weakens prosecution and creates reasonable doubt. 8 Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement 13 May Supreme Court Even if PMLA complaint filed before BNSS enforcement, cognizance after 1 July 2024 must comply with mandatory pre-cognizance hearing under first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS; failure renders proceedings void ab initio. 9 State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Ors. 19 May Supreme Court BNSS & PMLA IPC In circumstantial evidence and conspiracy cases under Sections 302 & 120-B IPC, circumstances must form integrated chain; crime scene re-enactment with accused does not violate Article 20(3) unless testimonial compulsion. 10 Chetan Dashrath

Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd. & Ors. 10 Apr Supreme Court Constitution Regulatory statutory control does not make co-operative societies “State” under Article 12; internal election bye-laws mandating minimal participation are valid eligibility criteria, not illegal disqualifications. 10 Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi 10 Apr Supreme Court Hindu Law Mutual consent for divorce can be withdrawn before final decree, but spouse cannot arbitrarily resile from

Maharashtra 19 May Supreme Court IEA In unnatural death inside matrimonial home, husband’s failure to furnish credible explanation for facts within his knowledge permits adverse inference under Section 106 Evidence Act. 11 Parvathi Nairthi (D) & Ors. v. Laxmi Nairthy (D) through LRs & Ors. 21 May Supreme Court IEA Exclusion of natural heirs from Will not suspicious if Will duly proved under Section 63 Succession Act & Section 68 Evidence Act and testator disclosed rational reason for exclusion. 12 Vijaya Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu 21 May Supreme Court 22 May Supreme Court IPC Conviction for criminal intimidation under Sections 503 & 506 Part II IPC sustainable on prosecutrix’s credible testimony even without recovery of phone/video used for blackmail, where threats caused genuine alarm and invaded dignity/privacy under Article 21. ### Not for Sale ### ONE Liner Jan to May-2026 13 Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana & Anr. IPC Seriousness/dangerous nature of injury insufficient for Section 307 IPC without intention/knowledge to cause death; such cases may fall under Section 325 IPC for grievous hurt. 14 Arti Mehta &

Madhya Pradesh & Anr. 25 May Supreme Court IPC Merely advising wife to “adjust” in matrimonial life, absent specific cruelty/dowry demand allegations, does not attract liability under Section 498A IPC against husband’s relatives. 25 May Supreme Court

of Investigation (2018 SC) was overruled in which the court directed that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. Constitut ion CRPC The court differentiated between cancellation bail and setting aside of bail. Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, (i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal Supreme court Family Law ### XXXX VERSUS ### STATE OF Supreme court This Court opined that the stability and security of the child is an essential ingredient for full development of child's talent and personality. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody of the child under any personal law cannot and must not supersede the paramount consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no statute on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor of the welfare of the minor. activity, (ii) interferes with the course of investigation, (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. ### SHAZIA AMAN ### KHAN AND ### ANOTHER ### VERSUS THE ### STATE OF ORISSA ### AND OTHERS IPC A woman who is married at the time when relations started ### MADHYA ### PRADESH & ### ANOTHER cannot be said to have consented to sexual intercourse on the promise of marriage and thus the court quashed a FIR u/s 376 IPC. M. ### Radheshyamlal ### versus V ### Sandhya and Anr. Etc. Supreme court SRA When a party claims adverse possession, he must know who the actual owner of the property is. Secondly, he must plead that he was in open and uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years to the original owner's knowledge. ### NBCC (INDIA) ### LIMITED VERSUS ### ZILLION INFRA ### PROJECTS PVT.LTD. Supreme court Arbitrati on General reference to a contract will no have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause in another contract, to have the effect of incorporating the arbitration clause specific reference is needed. A.M. MOHAN v. ### THE STATE REP BY SHO. Supreme court CRPC The Court reiterated the principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction by High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings as have been stated in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal [1992 SC] which are as follows: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v.) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. ### SRIKANT UPADHYAY VS. ### THE STATE OF BIHAR. Supreme court CRPC Pending the application for anticipatory bail, the Court can proceed further in terms of the provisions under Section 82, Cr. complaint, merely on the ground ### RAKESH RANJAN ### SHRIVASTAVA ### VERSUS THE ### STATE OF ### JHARKHAND & ANR Supreme court P.C. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows: i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim NIA The Court held that Section 143NIA is directory and not mandatory. ### NIRMAL ### PREMKUMAR & ### ANR. VERSUS ### STATE REP. BY ### INSPECTOR OF ### POLICE Supreme court compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive. attached to the testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences where the prosecution's case hinges on the victim's evidence is: Oral testimony may be classified into three categories, viz. : (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The first two category of cases may not pose serious difficulty for the Court in arriving at its conclusion(s). However, in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and look for corroboration of any material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a requirement of the rule of prudence. Evidence Law regarding the weight to be ### SUSELA ### PADMAVATHY AMMA VS. M/S. ### BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED. NIA Merely because a person is a director of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware about the day-to- day functioning of the company. This Court held that there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs. It was, therefore, necessary, to aver as to how the director of the company was in charge of day-to-day affairs of the company or responsible to the affairs of the company to make him liable under section 141 NIA. ### BASAVARAJ ### VERSUS INDIRA ### AND OTHERS Supreme court Supreme court CPC The Court held that an application for amendment may be rejected if it seeks to introduce totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the suit. An application seeking an amendment to the plaint shouldn't be allowed under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC if the amendment alters the nature of the suit. ### M/s Arif Azim ### Co. Ltd. Versus M/s Aptech Ltd. Supreme court Arbitrati on While considering the issue of limitation in relation to a petition under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, the courts should satisfy themselves on two aspects by employing a two-pronged test - first, whether the petition under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 is barred by limitation; and ### State of Punjab ### versus Gurpreet Singh &Ors. Supreme court secondly, whether the claims sought to be arbitrated are ex- facie dead claims and are thus barred by limitation on the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings. If either of these issues are answered against the party seeking referral of disputes to arbitration, the court may refuse to appoint an arbitral tribunal. While exercising powers under Article 136 of the Constitution Supreme Court can interfere with the order of the acquittal if the acquittal of an accused would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. Court outlined the principles guiding its intervention in acquittal orders under Article 136. These are: (i) An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse. This occurs when the High Court, based on suspicion and surmises, rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. (ii) Another circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a Constitut ion significant miscarriage of justice. This refers to situations where the High Court, through a cursory examination of evidence, severs the connection between the accused and the crime. Major Gen. ### Darshan Singh (D) By Lrs. &Anr. v. ### BrijBhushanChau dhary (D) by Lrs. Supreme court SRA Supreme Court denied a plaintiff's plea for specific performance on account of false/incorrect statements made by him in the plaint. N. MANOGAR vs. ### THE INSPECTOR ### OF POLICE Supreme court CRPC Power Under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the magistrate or the sessions judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. ### SRINIVAS ### RAGHAVENDRAR ### AO DESAI (DEAD) ### BY LRS. VERSUS Supreme court CPC No Evidence Could Be Led Beyond Pleadings ### V. KUMAR ### VAMANRAO @ ALOK AND ORS. ### DISTRICT ### APPROPRIATE ### AUTHORITY ### UNDER THE ### PNDT ACT AND ### CHIEF DISTRICT ### HEALTH OFFICER ### vs. JASHMINA ### DILIP DEVDA PCPNDT The Supreme Court held that the suspension/cancellation of the registration of the Hospital/Clinic under Section 20(3) of the Pre- Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 ("PC&PNDT Act") is permissible only when the Appropriate Authority believes that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest. After perusing the suspension order passed by the appropriate authority by exercising the power to cancel/suspend the registration of respondent no.1 under Section 20 (3) of the Act, the court found that the contents of the suspension order does not contain reasons as required to form an opinion that it is necessitated or expedient in public interest to exercise the power of suspension. Therefore, in our view, it does not fulfill the requirement of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the PC & PNDT Act. M/S A.K. ### SARKAR & CO. & ### ANR. VERSUS ### THE STATE OF Supreme court Supreme court Constitut ion The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which ### WEST BENGAL & ORS. was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition, for the Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. If the law reduces the punishment for an offence, there is no reason why the accused should not have the benefit of such reduced punishment. The rule of beneficial construction requires that even ex post facto law of such a type should be applied to mitigate the rigour of the law. This principle is based both on sound reason and common sense. ### NAVAS @ MULANAVAS vs. ### STATE OF KERALA. Supreme court CRPC The Court discussed considerations to be taken care of before imposing death sentence. ### THE STATE OF JHARKHAND vs. ### SANDEEP ### KUMAR Supreme court CRPC Supreme Court noted that, though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. It was observed that an order of bail, bereft of any cogent reason, could not be sustained. ### NARESH KUMAR ### & ANR. VERSUS ### THE STATE OF ### KARNATAKA & ANR. Supreme court CRPC The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court by exercising their inherent power must quash the prosecution based on the criminal complaint arising out of a civil transaction. S.P. ### VELAYUTHAM & ANR. ### VERSUS ### M/S EMAAR MGF ### LAND ### LIMITED Supreme court CCA The Supreme Court held that merely because the dispute is related to an immovable property wouldn't per se make it a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 unless the immovable property is 'actually used' exclusively in trade or commerce. ### BALLU @ ### BALRAM @ ### BALMUKUND ### AND ANOTHER ### VERSUS THE ### STATE OF ### MADHYA ### PRADESH Supreme court Evidence The Court reiterated the law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The principle "Falsus in uno, Falsus in Omnibus” is not applicable in criminal trial. ### PREM RAJ ### VERSUS ### POONAMMA MENON & ANR. Supreme court NIA Observing that a judgment of the civil court will be binding on the criminal court to the extent of sentences or damages, the Supreme Court set aside a conviction in a criminal case for ### UNION OF INDIA ### & ANR. VERSUS ### JAHANGIR ### BYRAMJI ### JEEJEEBHOY (D) ### THROUGH HIS LR Supreme court ### MAYA GOPINATHAN vs. ### ANOOP Supreme court Hindu Law cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act based on a finding in a civil suit between the same parties that the cheque was offered as a security. Law of limitation applies to Government as well. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. The question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles ’hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. While considering the application for condonation of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause ’has to be liberally construed. 1. In civil cases the standard of proof is satisfied on a balance of probabilities. In matrimonial cases proof on Limitatio n ### MUKHTAR ZAIDI ### VS. THE STATE ### OF UTTAR ### PRADESH Supreme court balance of probabilities is sufficient. 2. The properties gifted to a woman before marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of bidding of farewell or thereafter are her stridhan properties. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. The husband has no control over her stridhan property. He may use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. Therefore, stridhan property does not become a joint property of the wife and the husband and the husband has no title or independent dominion over the property as owner thereof. CRPC The Supreme Court held that if the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues summons to an accused by recording satisfaction based on the additional evidence produced along with a protest petition filed by the informant, then such a protest petition ought to be treated as a private complaint case under Section 200 of the ### CHANDAN ### VERSUS THE ### STATE (DELHI ADMN.). Supreme court ### RAVISHANKAR TANDON vs. ### STATE OF ### CHHATTISGARH Supreme court Code of Criminal Procedure. the confidence of the court, the prosecution is not required to establish motive. Mere absence of motive would not impinge on the testimony of a reliable eye- witness. Motive is an important factor for consideration in a case of circumstantial evidence. But when there is direct eye witness, motive is not significant. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that, based on the information given by the accused while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of the fact, which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the said statement. It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is true and it can therefore be safely Evidence When ocular testimony inspires Evidence For bringing the case under allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. ### PERNOD RICARD INDIA (P) LTD. ### vs. THE STATE OF ### MADHYA PRADESH. Supreme court IOS A repealed provision will cease to operate from the date of repeal and the substituted provision will commence to operate from the date of its substitution. This principle is subject to specific statutory prescription. Statute can enable the repealed provision to continue to apply to transactions that have commenced before the repeal. Similarly, a substituted provision which operates prospectively, if it affects vested rights, subject to statutory prescriptions, can also operate retrospectively. ### ANIRUDDHA ### KHANWALKAR ### VERSUS ### SHARMILA DAS ### & OTHERS Supreme court CRPC For summoning of an accused, prima facie case made out on the basis of allegations in the complaint and the pre- summoning evidence led by the complainant is sufficient, the Supreme Court held. Supreme court CRPC the Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain the following:— Dablu Kujur V. ### The State Of ### Jharkhand (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (b) the names of the parties; (c) the nature of the information; (d) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (e) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (f) whether the accused has been arrested; (g) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (h) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170. (i) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the Penal Code, 1860” investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr. P.C. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). ### RAJENDRA S/O ### RAMDAS KOLHE ### VERSUS STATE Supreme Court Evidence The Supreme Court held that corroboration of the dying declaring statement isn't required (ii) If upon the completion of OF ### MAHARASHTRA when it inspires the confidence of the court to convict the accused. ### MUKATLAL ### VERSUS KAILASH ### CHAND (D) ### THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. Supreme Court Hindu Law The Supreme Court held that for a female Hindu to claim absolute ownership of an undivided property of a Hindu Undivided Family(HUF), she should have been in possession of the property. ### Rajendra ### Bhagwanji ### Umraniya Versus ### State of Gujarat ### Coram: Justices ### JB Pardiwala and ### ManojMisra Supreme Court CRPC The Supreme Court held that an order for the convict to pay compensation to the victim cannot be made a ground for the reduction of the sentence imposed on the convict. Supreme Court JJ 1. In Barun Chandra Thakur's case (supra) where requirement of such assistance was held to be mandatory, even though the words used in proviso to Section 15(1) and Section 101(2) of the Act are ‘may’. 2. The preliminary assessment into the heinous offence by the Board in terms of Section 15(1) of the Act has to be concluded within a period of three months in terms of Section 14(3) of the Act. The Act as such does not provide for any extension of time and also does not lay down the consequence of non- ### CHILD IN ### CONFLICT WITH LAW ### THROUGH HIS ### MOTHER ### VERSUS THE ### STATE OF ### KARNATAKA ### AND ANOTHER compilation of inquiry within the time permissible. In the absence thereof the provision prescribing time limit of completion of inquiry cannot be held to be mandatory. The intention of the legislature with reference to serious or heinous offences is also available from the language of Section 14 of the Act which itself provides for further extension of time for completion of inquiry by the Board to be granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the reasons to be recorded in writing. It is in addition to two months ’ extension which the Board itself can grant. Though, the right of appeal has been provided in Section 15(2) and Section 101(2) of the Act against an order passed under Section 18(3) after preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act, however, neither any time has been fixed for filing the appeal nor any provision is provided for condonation of delay in case need be. In our opinion, the same being an omission. In order to make the Act workable and putting timelines for exercise of statutory right of appeal which always is there, we deem it appropriate to fill up this gap, which otherwise does not go against the scheme of the Act. Hence, for the period for filing of appeal in Section 101(2), we take guidance from Section 101(1) of the Act. The period provided for filing the appeal therein is 30 days and in case sufficient cause is shown the power to condone the delay has also been conferred on the appellate authority. Timeline has also been provided for decision of appeal. ### SELVAMANI ### VERSUS THE ### STATE REP. BY ### THE INSPECTOR ### OF POLICE Supreme Court Evidence The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. Dolly Rani v. ### Manish Kumar ### Chanchal ### Coram: Justices ### BV Nagarathna ### and Augustine ### George Supreme Court Hindu Law For a Hindu marriage to be valid, it must be performed with the appropriate rites and ceremonies. Supreme Court NIA The Courts cannot compel the complainant in a chequedishonour case to give consent for the compounding of the complaint merely because the accused has compensated the complainant. Without consent of the complainant the offence can not be compounded. RAJ ### REDDY ### KALLEM ### Versus THE ### STATE OF ### HARYANA & ANR Supreme Court CPC A person who has been awarded monetary compensation but has not received it, can file appeal as indigent. ### ALIFIYA ### HUSENBHAI KESHARIYA v. ### SIDDIQ ISMAIL SINDHI & ORS. Supreme Court Evidence In rape cases , conviction can be ### State of ### Himachal ### Pradesh Versus ### Raghubir Singh ### and Others done solely on the basis of the testimony of rape victim. Ram ### PrakashChadha ### Versus The State ### of Uttar Pradesh Supreme Court CRPC The court discussed the principles related to discharge under section 227 CRPC. Supreme Court CPC The Supreme Court held that a compromise deed cannot be recognized unless it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties. ### AMRO DEVI & ### ORS. Versus ### JULFI RAM ### (DECEASED) THR.LRS. & ORS. ### Parvinder Singh ### Khurana v. ### Directorate of Enforcement. Supreme Court CRPC The bail orders should not be normally stayed. The Court stated that bail orders can be stayed only in exceptional circumstances. ### SHRI ### GURUDATTA ### SUGARS ### MARKETING Supreme Court NIA The Supreme Court held that an authorized signatory of the company could not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and Supreme Court CRPC Against order rejecting the application seeking modification of the charge framed under Section 216 of Cr. P.C. the Revision Application is not maintainable as such an order is interlocutory in nature. ### K. RAVI v. STATE ### OF TAMIL NADU &ANR. Supreme Court Hindu Law The Supreme Court held recently that Stridhan is the exclusive property of the woman, and her father cannot claim recovery of Stridhan from in-laws without explicit authorisation from her. ### Mulakala ### Malleshwara Rao & Anr. v. ### State of ### Telangana &Anr. Supreme Court CRPC Court discussed the principles underlining the exercise of power to adjudicate a challenge against acquittal bolstered by concurrent findings. ### SRIDATTATRAYA ### VERSUS ### SHARANAPPA Supreme Court CPC The Court said that delay and laches not attributable to the defendant in filing a written statement could not come in a way to achieve substantive justice. PIC ### DEPARTMENTAL S PVT.LTD. ### VERSUS ### SREELEATHERS PVT.LTD. Supreme Court NIA The Supreme Court reiterated that dishonour of cheque cases can be compounded under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act) only with the consent of a complainant. A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. V. ### Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ### Radheyshyam & Supreme IPC Mere non-performance of therefore, could not be directed to pay the interim compensation to the complainant under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881. ### PVT. LTD. Versus ### PRITHVIRAJ ### SAYAJIRAO ### DESHMUKH & ORS. ### Ors. v. State of ### Rajasthan &Anr Court Agreement to Sell by itself does not amount to the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust. Supreme Court CRPC The Supreme Court held that if an accused, involved in multiple cases, is enlarged on bail and is unable to find multiple sureties, the court must balance the requirement of sureties with his right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. ### Girish ### Gandhi ### v.The ### State of ### Uttar Pradesh &Ors. Supreme Court NIA Merely because the interest rate is disputed, it cannot be said that the amount mentioned in cheque is not legally enforceable debt. ### SRI SUJIES ### BENEFIT FUNDS ### LIMITED VERSUS M. ### JAGANATHUAN Supreme Court SRA and TPA Co-Owner Whose Share In Joint Property Remained Undetermined Cannot Transfer Entire Property ### SK. GOLAM ### LALCHAND ### VERSUS NANDU ### LAL SHAW @ ### NANDLALKESHR ### I@NANDULALB AYES&ORS. Supreme Court IPC When Accused Is Roped In For Being Member of Unlawful Assembly , Whether He Caused Injury Is Irrelevant ### Nitya ### Nand v. ### State of U.P. & Anr. Supreme Court Evidence The Supreme Court held that a ### RAGHUVEER ### SHARANVERSUS witness who gives an ### DISTRICTSAHAKA RI ### KRISHIGRAMINVI KASBANK&ANR. incriminating statement cannot take a shield under proviso of Section 132 of the Evidence Act to claim immunity from prosecution if there exists other substantial evidence or material against him proving his prima facie involvement in the crime. ### Devendra Kumar ### Pal v. State of UP and Anr. Supreme Court CRPC If such a summoning order is passed , either after the order of acquittal or imposing of sentence in the conviction , the same may not be sustainable. Supreme Court IPC The Court reiterated that for convicting an accused under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code , it must be proved that soon before her death , the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in relation to the alleged demand of dowry in connection with marriage. ### SHOOR SINGH & ANR. ### VERSUS ### STATE OF ### UTTARAKHAND DV The Supreme Court held that alteration/modification/ revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) can be sought through Section 25(2) only on the basis of change of circumstances which took place subsequent to the passing of the order. ### COX & ### KING0S ### LTD. VERSUS SAP ### INDIA PVT. LTD. & Supreme Court S Vijikumari v. ### Mowneshwaracha ### ri C Supreme Court Arbitrati on Scope of hearing under Section 11 of Arbitration and ANR Conciliation Act, 1996 is limited to the extent of requirement of existence of an arbitration agreement. Supreme Court CRPC An accused already in custody in connection with one case can apply for anticipatory bail in connection with another case. ### DHANRAJ ### ASWANI Versus AMAR S. ### MULCHANDANI ### AND ANR CRPC The contextual facts and the attendant circumstances have to be singularly evaluated and analyzed to decide the needfulness of further investigation or reinvestigation to unravel the truth and mete out justice to the parties. ### K. BHARTHI DEVI AND ANR. ### VERSUS STATE ### OF TELANGANA ### & ANR Supreme Court ### K. Vadivel Versus ### K. Shanthi & Ors CRPC The Supreme Court observed that criminal cases arising out of civil transactions should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. ### STATE OF ### MADHYA ### PRADESH ### VERSUS RAMJI ### LAL SHARMA ### &ANOTHER Supreme Court Supreme Court JJ The Supreme Court observed that the plea of juvenility can be filed even after the judgment and order of conviction and sentence granted against a person has attained finality. ### R.P. GARG ### VERSUS THE ### CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER, ### TELECOM ### DEPARTMENT & Supreme Court Arbitrati on The Supreme Court held that the post-award period shall carry a rate of interest decided as per Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. ORS. Shingara Singh v. ### Diljith Singh and ### another ### Coram: Justices ### Hrishikesh Roy ### and PK Mishra Supreme Court TPA The Supreme Court has reiterated that once a transaction is found to be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, then the defences of being a bona fide purchaser and lack of notice regarding the sale agreement are not available. CRPC When a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on the investigation, the Court "must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report" before taking a call on whether the proceedings should be quashed or not. ### ASIM AKHTAR ### VERSUS THE ### STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR. Supreme Court ### Somjeet Mallick v. ### State of ### Jharkhand &Ors CRPC It is not mandatory for the trial court to decide Section 319 Cr.P.C. application after the completion of the prosecution witness's examination in chief and can exercise its discretion to decide the application even after completion cross-examination. ### N. THAJUDEEN ### VERSUS TAMIL ### NADU KHADI ### AND VILLAGE ### INDUSTRIES ### BOARD Supreme Court SRA The Supreme Court observed that when along with a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is sought, the limitation period would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. ### G Ramratan @ ### Ramswaroop ### &Anr. v. State of ### Madhya Pradesh Supreme Court Supreme Court CRPC The Court shall not impose onerous bail conditions. ### Public Political ### Party vs. Union of ### India Supreme Court Constitut ion The Supreme Court held that appointment of appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers is not unconstitutional ### Association for ### Democratic Reforms &Anr. v. ### Union of India &Ors. Supreme Court Constitut ion The Supreme Court delivered judgment in the electoral bonds case, holding that anonymous electoral bonds are violative of the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the scheme has been struck down as unconstitutional. Rupashree H.R. ### Vs. The State of Karnataka &Ors. Supreme Court Constitut ion The Supreme Court held that the right to defend oneself is a fundamental right under the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer and no resolution could be passed by the Bar Association to forbid other members of the bar to appear on behalf of the petitioner who appeared in person to defend its case. ### MK Ranjit sinh And Ors. v. ### Union of India Supreme Court Constitut ion The Supreme Court has recognized right to be free from the adverse ffects of climate change as a e And Ors. distinct right. The Court said that Articles 14 (equality before law and he equal protection of laws) and 21 (right to life and personal iberty) of the Indian Constitution re important sources of this right. COMMISSION OF (VVPAT) records. ### INDIA Evidence act The settled legal principle regarding the ### CASE: ABDUL ### NASSAR v. STATE ### OF KERALA & ### ANR. CORAM: JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, K.V. ### VISWANATHAN ### and SANDEEP ### MEHTA DATED: JANUARY 07, ### 2025 conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence as crystallized in the landmark case of Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984 SC) was upheld. IPC Wherein the witness identifies the accused ### CASE: ### VENKATESHA AND OTHERS v. ### STATE OF ### KARNATAKA for the first time in the court that too after a significant gap of years and there has been no Test Identification Parade conducted then it may raise doubt over the Kidnapping from lawful guardianship will not apply when the age of the girl is above 18 years. case of the prosecution. ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### B.R. GAVAI AND ### AUGUSTINE ### GEORGE MASIH ### DATED: 09 ### JANUARY, 2025 arbitration Section 4 of the Limitation Act is not ### CASE-MY ### PREFERRED ### TRANSFORMATIO ### N & HOSPITALITY ### PVT LTD. AND ### ANOTHER v. M/S ### FARIDABAD ### IMPLEMENTS PVT ### LTD CORAM- JUSTICE P.S. ### NARASIMHA AND ### PANKAJ MITHAL ### DATED-JANUARY ### 10TH 2025 applicable to the condonable 30-day period under the Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. CRPC If there exists a decree for the restitution ### CASE: RINA ### KUMARI @ RINA DEVI @ REENA v. ### DINESH KUMAR ### MAHTO @ ### DINESH KUMAR ### MAHATO AND ### ANOTHER ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### SANJIV KHANNA ### AND SANJAY ### KUMAR DATED: JANUARY 10, ### 2025 of conjugal rights in favour of the husband and the wife still chooses not to join the matrimonial home then it does not amount to voluntary refusal or desertion to bar her claim of maintenance under Section 125 (4) of the CRPC. ### VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR ### CASE: ### CUDDALORE ### POWERGEN ### CORPORATION ### LTD v. M/S ### CHEMPLAST ### CUDDALORE CPC The bar of Ord er II Rule 2 CPC appl ies whe n the caus e of actio n of both the suits is the sam e. ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### J.B. PARDIWALA AND R. ### MAHADEVAN ### DATED: 15th ### January, 2025 IEA Legitimacy determines paternity under ### CASE: IVAN RATHINAM v. ### MILAN JOSEPH ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### SURYA KANT and ### UJJAL BHUYAN ### DATED: JANUARY ### 28, 2025 Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ―non access‖. ### CASE: CONSTABLE ### 907 SURENDRA IPC The essential for the Section 34 of the IPC is prior meeting of minds SINGH & ANR. v. ### STATE OF ### UTTARAKHAND ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### B.R. GAVAI and ### AUGUSTINE ### GEORGE MASIH ### DATED: JANUARY ### 28, 2025 IEA There cannot be a conviction solely on the basis of the disclosure statement under the ### KERALA CORAM: ### JUSTICE ABHAY S ### CASE: VINOBHAI ### v. STATE OF Section 27 of the IEA when it is unaccompanied by any other supporting evidences. ### OKA AND UJJAL ### BHUYAN DATED: JANUARY 29, 2025 | | Rajeev IAS IPC For attracting the provision of Section ### RELATING TO ### SECTION 304-B ### AND 498-A IPC ### CASE: KARAN ### SINGH v. STATE ### OF HARYANA ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### ABHAY S. OKA ### AND UJJAL ### BHUYAN DATED: JANUARY 31, ### 2025 304-B of the IPC the deceased should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or the relative of her husband with respect to the demand of dowry ―soon before‖ her death. IEA Extra-judicial confessions are weak ### CASE: Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. ### State of ### Maharashtra ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### ABHAY S. OKA ### AND UJJAL ### BHUYAN DATED: ### February 04, 2025 ### Relating to extra ### judicial confession evidence and must inspire confidence of the court after corroboration with other evidence. IPC In order to constitute an offence under ### CASE: TILKU ALIAS TILAK SINGH v. ### STATE OF ### UTTARAKHAND ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### B.R. GAVAI AND ### JUSTICE K. VINOD ### CHANDRAN ### DATED: ### FEBRUARY 6, 2025 ### Relating to ### kidnapping from ### lawful ### guardianship Section 361 of IPC of kidnapping from lawful guardianship, the prerequisite is that the taking or enticing away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian. CRPC The arrest of the accused stands vitiated if it does not comply with the mandate of ### Haryana and Anr Article 22 (2) of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of CRPC. ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### Abhay S Oka and ### Nongmeikapam ### Kotiswar Singh ### DATED: February ### 07, 2025 Relating ### to illegal arrest ### CASE: Vihaan ### Kumar v. State of IPC Section 306 IPC requires that the accused ### CASE: Ayyub & ### Ors. v. State of ### Uttar Pradesh & ### Anr. CORAM: ### JUSTICE SANJIV ### KHANNA, SANJAY KUMAR AND K. V. ### VISWANATHAN ### DATED: 7th ### February, 2025 ### Relating to ### Section 306 IPC person has contributed to the suicide by the deceased by some direct or indirect act. IPC A senior reprimand is not “intentional insult with the intent to provoke breach of ### Telangana and ### Another CORAM: ### CASE: B.V. Ram ### Kumar v. State of peace” under Section 504 of the IPC wherein it extends to discipline and ### Justice Sanjay discharge of duties. ### Karol and ### Sandeep Mehta ### DATED: February ### 10, 2025 Relating ### to Section 506 IPC ### & Connected ### Case: Om Prakash ### Gupta Alias ### Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. ### v. Satish Chandra ### (Now Deceased) CPC When the applica tion for the substitu tion of legal heirs has been filed then there is no require ment of a separat e prayer to set aside the abatem ent. ### Matter CORAM: ### JUSTICE ### DIPANKAR DATTA ### AND PRASHANT ### KUMAR MISHRA ### DATED: FEBRUARY 11, ### 2025 Relating to ### abatement ### CASE: Sukhdev ### Singh v. Sukhbir ### Kaur CORAM: ### JUSTICE Abhay S ### Oka, Ahsanuddin ### Amanullah and ### Augustine George ### Masih DATED: ### February 12, 2025 ### Relating to ### maintenance ### under void ### marriage under ### the Hindu Marriage Act, ### 1955 ### CASE: Vinod ### Kumar v. State ### (Govt. of NCT of ### Delhi) CORAM: ### JUSTICE Abhay S ### Oka AND Ujjal ### Bhuyan DATED: ### February 13, 2025 ### Relating to ### circumstantial ### evidence CRPC ### CASE: STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. ### SURENDRA SINGH ### RATHORE permanent alimony or pendente maintenance can be granted even in cases of void marriage. circumstantial evidence the law is well- settled that the circumstances must conclusively point towards the guilt of the accused that he is the author of the crime. The permissibility of the registration of the second FIR when the former exists. HMA Under the Hindu Marriage act, 1955, the IEA For conviction on the basis of ### CORAM: JUSTICE ### SANJAY KAROL ### AND PRASHANT ### KUMAR MISHRA ### DATED: 19th ### February 2025 ### Relating to ### Second FIR ### CASE: VISHAL SHAH v. ### MONALISHA ### GUPTA & ORS ### CORAM: JUSTICE The Hon’ble Supreme Court can exercise the discretionary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve the ### PANKAJ MITHAL marriage between the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in order to do “complete justice” ### AND SANDEEP ### MEHTA DATED: FEBRUARY 20, ### 2025 Relating to ### irretrievable ### breakdown of ### marriage HMA ### ASSOCIATION Supreme Misc. The Supreme Court rejected the FOR ### DEMOCRATIC ### REFORMS ### ELECTION Court pleas seeking 100% cross- verification of Electronic Voting Machines(EVMs)data with Voter Verifiable Paper AuditTrail vs ### ONE LINER LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES MARCH 2025 1. In the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus). Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences 2. Section 34(2)(b) - An Arbitral Award upholding agreement to return acquired land is liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b) as it is in conflict with the public policy of India. Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi 3. Condition for Automatic Custody Upon Charge-Sheet Submission - Such a specific direction, mandating coercive steps for custody, was improper. When granting anticipatory bail, the court should leave it open for the trial court to decide on bail after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused appears. Ritesh ### Kumar v. State of Bihar 4. Cancellation of BAIL - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P. 5. Moratorium of 1 year imposed by high court to apply for bail afresh - Such a restriction was impermissible. Md. Gulzar v. State of Bihar 6. When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. Sharmila Velamur v. V. ### Sanjay 7. Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. Periyammal v. V. Rajamani 8. Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. Ram Lal v. ### Jarnail Singh 9. Section 149 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - General statements by witnesses, without specific attribution of roles, are insufficient to convict individuals in cases involving large crowds, and the police should be cautious to book such individuals who were just bystanders without having any participation in the unlawful assembly. Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 10. Section 196 BNS - Promoting enmity between groups - When an offence under section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of spoken or written words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect of spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of standards of the people who always have a sense of insecurity or those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position. Imran ### Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat 11. The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. State of Rajasthan v. Chatra 12. Mere harassment or blackmail, without direct incitement or proximate acts compelling suicide, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 306

13. The Court reiterated that a breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed at the time of consent. ### Jothiragawan v. State 14. If a court intends to add a person as an accused, it cannot direct the police to include their name in the charge sheet. Instead, the court may issue a summons to the proposed accused if sufficient grounds exist, even if they are not named in the charge sheet. Gopal Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh 15. Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50 crpc, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Ashish ### Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh 16. Section 154 Cr.P.C. The police authorities are not vested with any discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry to assess the credibility of the information before registering the F.I.R. Any such practice would be contrary to the established principles of criminal law. Amit Kumar v. Union of India 17. Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Delay in recording an eyewitness's testimony would not draw an adverse inference against the prosecution's case if the delay is adequately explained. Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra 18. Section 200 Cr.P.C. / Section 223 BNSS - Recording the complainant's statement on oath under Section 200 of the CrPC is not an empty formality. The object of recording the complainant's statement and witnesses, if any, is to ascertain the truth. Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd. 19. Section 256 Cr.P.C. / Section 279 BNSS - Non-appearance of a complainant will not always result in the acquittal of the accused. Acquittal under this section is warranted only when the complainant is absent on the date which was set for the appearance of the accused. If the date was set for a purpose other than the appearance of the accused, the absence of the complainant on such a date will not warrant the acquittal of the accused. Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh ### Bhardwaj 20. Section 482 Cr.P.C. There is no absolute rule that the High Court cannot interfere in a Section 482 CrPC petition if the investigation is at a primary stage. Kulandaisamy v. State represented by its Inspector of Police 21. Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 22. Section 14 partnership Act - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje 23. Section 28 SRA 1963 - Mere delay in depositing the balance sale consideration does not render a decree of specific performance inexecutable. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, considering factors such as the bona fides of the decree holder, the cause of delay, and the equities created in favor of the judgment debtor. Ram ### Lal v. Jarnail Singh ### SC ONE Liner April-2025 ### Rajiv Ghosh V. Satya CPC “The primary object underlying Order XII ### Narain ### Jaiswal Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of admission. Where a plaintiff claims a particular relief or reliefs against a defendant and the defendant makes a plain admission, the former is entitled to the relief or reliefs admitted by the latter. The provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive. They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory. This is also clear from the use of the word “may” in the rule.” Ramanuj Kumar V. HMA The hon‟ble court granted Divorce under ### Priyanka Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice and dissolve the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.- “Multiple attempts at reconciliation through mediation have failed. Neither party has shown any willingness or inclination to restore the marital bond. The parties have lived separate lives for over a decade, and there is a complete absence of marital ties.” ### Biswajyoti Chatterjee IPC/CRPC Every consensual relationship, where a V. ### State of ### West possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be ### Bengal given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out. It is such lis that amounts to an abuse of process of law, and it is under such circumstances, that we deem fit to terminate the proceedings at the stage of charge itself. ### S.C. Garg NIA “Findings in NI Act proceedings bind parties in subsequent cases involving same issue” V. ### State of ### Uttar ### Pradesh and Another ### State of Tamil Nadu V. ### Governor of ### Tamil ### Nadu ### Satbir Singh V. Rajesh ### Kumar and Others absolute or “pocket veto” over bills passed by the State Legislature.  Judicial Review: Judicial scrutiny is allowed under Articles 200 and 201 when delays or refusals by the Governor or President raise constitutional issues.  President is required to take a decision on the bills reserved for his consideration by the Governor within a period of three months from the date on which reference is received.  The word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.  A person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be Constitution  State Governors do not possess an CRPC The following was held in context of Section 319 of CrPC: tested by cross-examination.  The degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would be the same as for framing a charge M/S ### Faime ### Makers Administrativ

### Pvt. Ltd. V. District e law U.P and held “the principle of res judicata ### Deputy Registrar, Co- applies to and binds quasi-judicial ### Operative ### Societies authorities.” (3), Mumbai & Ors. ### Munnesh v State of CRPC/BNSS “each individual who approaches Supreme UP Court with a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) challenging orders passed by the high courts/sessions courts declining prayers under Sections 438/439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or under Sections 482/483, Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita shall mandatorily disclose in the „SYNOPSIS‟ that either he is a man of clean antecedents or if he has knowledge of his involvement in any criminal case, he shall clearly indicate the same together with the stage that the proceedings, arising out of such case, have reached. Should the disclosure be found to be incorrect subsequently, that itself could be considered as a ground for dismissal of the special leave petition.” G.C. Manjunath & Ors. CRPC Under Section 197 CrPC, a court cannot ### v. Seetaram take cognisance of offences allegedly committed by a public servant in the course of, or in purported discharge of, official duties without prior sanction from the competent government. Registration  The registering officer is not ### K. Gopi v. The Sub- Registrar & Ors. concerned with the title held by the executant. He has no adjudicatory power to decide whether the executant has any title.  Even if an executant executes a sale deed or a lease in respect of a land in respect of which he has no title, the registering officer cannot refuse to register the document if all the procedural compliances are made and the necessary stamp duty as well as registration charges/fee are paid. ### Rakesh Kumar Verma Contract  Section 28 of the Contract Act does v. HDFC Bank Ltd, not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. ### HDFC Bank vs Deepti What has been barred is the absolute ### Bhatia restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum.  the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. A contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place. ### Amruddin ### Ansari CPC An order of dismissal of a suit or application ### (Dead)Through Lrs & in default under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX ### Ors. V. Afajal Ali & of the C.P.C. is neither an adjudication or a Ors. decree nor it is an appealable order. Thus, does not fulfill the requirement of the term “judgment” or “decree”, inasmuch as there is no adjudication Therefore, if a fresh suit is filed, then such an order of dismissal cannot and shall not operate a res judicata. ### May 2025 SC cases one liner Gayatri Balasamy v. ### ISG Novasoft ### Technologies Ltd Arbitration The Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award. Conciliation This limited power may be exercised under the Act following circumstances: I. when the award is severable, by severing the “invalid” portion from the “valid” portion of the award. II. by correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record. III. post award interest may be modified in some circumstances. IV. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power must be exercised with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power. ### Raju alias Umakant IPC  Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a ### V. State of Madhya 21-year-old gang rape case from Madhya ### Pradesh Pradesh.  It ruled that even if only one person commits penetration, all others involved with common intention can be held guilty under Section 376(2)(g) IPC. if rape had been committed by even one, all the accused will be guilty irrespective of the fact that she had been raped by one or more of them and it is not necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of a completed act of rape by each one of the accused. ### Shenbagavalli and IPC The essential ingredients Section 306 IPC- ### Others V. Inspector (i) the abetment of Police, (ii) intention of the accused to aid and ### Kancheepuram instigate or abet the deceased to commit ### District and Another suicide. “Merely because the act of an accused is highly insulting to the deceased by using abusive language would not by itself constitute abetment of suicide. There should be evidence suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.” Harjinder Singh V. CRPC The court held “the power under ### State of Punjab and Section 319 CrPC is triggered not by conjecture ### Another but by “evidence” that surfaces in Court.” The court relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab ### In Re: Alarming Rise POCSO Directions issues by the Hon‟ble SC vide order ### in the Number of dated 25.07.2019 were reiterated and held “It is ### Reported Child Rape expected that the Union of India and the State ### Incidents Governments shall take appropriate steps to sensitize the officials associated with the investigation of POCSO cases, and also to create dedicated Courts to try POCSO Cases on top priority basis, and to see to it that the chargesheets are filed within the mandatory period stipulated in the Act, and the Trials are completed within the time frame as contemplated in the Act.” ### Muruganandam V. SRA “When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in ### Muniyandi evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act, 1908.” Pragya Prasun and Constitution The court recognised the State's obligations under ### Others Article 21- read with Articles 14,15 and 38 of ### V. Union of India and the Constitution- “The right to digital access, ### Others emerges as an intrinsic component of the right to life and liberty, necessitating that the State proactively design and implement inclusive digital ecosystems that serve not only the privileged but also the marginalized, those who have been historically excluded.” ### Dileep ### Kumar Constitution In a 2:1 decision the hon‟ble SC held the Air Force ### Pandey V. UOI School is not a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution. “It is not shown how the IAF headquarters has any control over the management of the said school. Although some funds may have originated from the Army Welfare Society, it cannot be said that the State or the IAF has any control, let alone all-pervasive control, over the school. Moreover, the said Society is not governed by any statutory rules.” ### Kabir ### Paharia V. Constitution The Hon‟ble Sc held that reasonable ### National ### Medical accommodation of a medical aspirant is not a ### Commission matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. “The constitutional promise of equality is not merely formal but substantive, requiring the State to take affirmative measures to ensure that PwD and PwBD can meaningfully participate in all spheres of life, including professional education. We emphasize that reasonable accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from Articles 14, 16, and 21 of our Constitution.” ### Ramyash @ Lal CRPC The Supreme Court held that the Allahabad High ### Bahadur v. The State Court erred in invoking Section 362 CrPC to alter ### of Uttar Pradesh its final judgment by converting a Section 302 IPC conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, affirming that courts cannot review or modify final criminal judgments under Section 362. All ### India ### Judges Service The Supreme Court restored the requirement of a ### Association v. Union minimum three-year practice as an advocate for ### of India & Ors candidates applying to entry-level judicial service posts. The judgment marks a reversal of the 2002 decision, which had abolished the three-year requirement following the Shetty Commission‟s recommendations. Practice of 3 years- Requirement: a) Certificate in case of practice in District courts: “a certificate to that effect duly certified either by the Principal Judicial Officer of that Court OR by an advocate of that Court having a minimum standing of 10 years duly endorsed by the Principal Judicial Officer of such a District or a Principal Judicial Officer at such a station.” b) Certificate in case of practice before the Supreme Court or High Courts: “they shall be certified by an advocate who has a minimum standing of 10 years, duly endorsed by an officer designated by that High Court or this Court.(SC)” c) In case of Law Clerks: “candidates which they have gained while working as Law Clerks with any of the Judges or Judicial Officers in the country should also be considered while calculating their total number of years of practice.” ### June 2025 SC one liners ### Harinagar Sugar Mills ### Ltd. (Biscuit Division) & Anr. v. ### State of Maharashtra & Ors. Constitution Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to shut down a business but is, of course, subject to reasonable restrictions. ### Nagarajan v. State of ### Tamil Nadu Constitution/CRPC The right to prefer an appeal is not only a statutory right but also a constitutional right in the case of an accused. This is because an accused has a right to not only challenge a judgment on its merits, namely, with respect to the conviction and sentence being imposed on him, but also on the procedural aspects of the trial ### Amlesh Kumar v. The ### State of Bihar IEA/ BSA The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narcoanalysis test at an appropriate stage. However, Court must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. Test without free consent violates their fundamental rights under Articles 20(3) and 21 ### Vijaya ### Bank v. ### Prashant B Narnaware Contract a restrictive covenant operating during the subsistence of an employment contract does not put a clog on the freedom of a contracting party to trade or employment. ### Aman Siddiqui Alias ### Aman Chaudhary Alias ### Raja v. ### State of ### Uttarakhand Family Law Uttarakhand Freedom of Religion Act, 2018- Marriage was consensual with the approval of their respective families, thus court granted bail. ### Ghanshyam ### Soni v. ### State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr CRPC The computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance Mahnoor Fatima Imran Registration Immovable property can be legally and & Ors. v. M/s ### Visweswara ### Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd & Ors. lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognised or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. M/S. ### Balaji ### Traders ### Versus The State of U.P. & Anr. IPC Putting a person in fear would make an accused guilty of an offence under Section 387 IPC; it need not satisfy all the ingredients of extortion provided under Section 383 IPC Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. ### Prakasan CPC the power to strike out or add a party to the proceedings under Order I Rule 10 can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceeding. However, the same cannot be construed to mean that when a particular party has been impleaded as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 4 after due inquiry by the court and without any objections, the party can approach the court anytime later and seek his deletion from the array of parties by filing an application under Order I Rule 10

The Supreme Court held that while determining sentence, courts must apply the principle of proportionality, and a long lapse of time without any similar criminal conduct is a relevant mitigating factor warranting reduction of sentence.

The Supreme Court held that where death is caused with the knowledge that it is likely to occur, but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC and not Part I.

The Supreme Court held that continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be established from the date of the agreement till the decree, and not merely from the date of filing the suit.

VIDYALAYA SADHAURA AND OTHERS(19th June) The Supreme Court held that a court cannot compel a plaintiff to accept compensation in lieu of an injunction when no such relief has been claimed, as it cannot grant relief beyond the pleadings.

The Supreme Court held that upon intestate succession under Sections 8 and 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, Class I heirs inherit as tenants in common, and no co-heir can alienate another heir’s share by claiming to act as the Karta of the family.

June) The Supreme Court held that where a request is made under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the limitation period under Section 34(3) commences only from the date on which that request is disposed of by the arbitral tribunal, irrespective of whether it is allowed or dismissed as not maintainable.

Consolidation, Haridwar & Others (23 June) The Supreme Court held that a registered sale deed carries a strong presumption of valid execution and genuineness, which cannot be displaced by trivial inconsistencies in the testimony of an attesting witness, particularly in the absence of any allegation of fraud, forgery, or impersonation.

The Supreme Court held that a psychological assessment of a child can be ordered only when demonstrably necessary, and must be conducted in a neutral, child-centric, and minimally intrusive manner, with the child’s welfare remaining the paramount consideration.

The Supreme Court held that after the substitution of Section 59(d) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the Municipal Commissioner became the competent disciplinary authority, notwithstanding any inconsistent pre-existing service regulations.

The Supreme Court referred to a larger Bench the question whether a third Judge under Section 392 CrPC is confined to the points of difference between the original Judges or can re-examine the entire appeal.